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Labor Law Access Rules and Stare
Decisis: Developing a Planned
Parenthood -Based Model of Reform
Rafael Gely*
Leonard Bierman**
This article deals with laborlaw access rules, particularlythe rights of
unions to gain access to employers' private property for organizing purposes. Professors Gely and Bierman provide a comprehensive analysis of
the access issue and identify two major problems with the manner in which
the Supreme Court has approachedthis area. First,the Supreme Court has
dealt piecemeal with the various aspects of this problem without attempting
to develop a coherentframework. Second, the Court has been reluctant to
analyze the access issue within the context of today's workplace.
Professors Gely and Bierman attribute the Supreme Court's flawed
approach to this area to the doctrine of stare decisis. They examine the role
of stare decisis in this context and argue that the Supreme Court's own
recent decision on stare decisis in the Planned Parenthood case, mandates a
need for reform with regardto labor law access rules.
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I.
INTRODUCTION

For over five decades the United States Supreme Court, the National
Labor Relations Board ("Board"), and most recently Congress, have struggled with the question of what access unions and employees should have to
the workplace.' While either granting unlimited access to unions and employees or completely closing the workplace to them, would represent simple clear-cut answers, neither provides a satisfactory resolution within the
statutory context provided by the National Labor Relations Act (the
"Act"). 2 The Act establishes the rights of employees to "form, join, or assist labor organizations, [and] to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing." 3 This right, as the Court has recognized, must
be accompanied by a corresponding right to have the opportunity to receive
information about the benefits and costs of collective action. 4 Thus, the
Act's substantive organizational rights are of little import if not accompanied by employee rights to obtain comprehensive information from unions
and other employees about unionization.5 Conversely, Congress and the
judiciary have been very concerned with the encroachments that the Act, in
particular its provisions granting organizational rights to employees, makes
on the constitutionally protected property rights of employers. 6 By defini1. We will refer to this problem as the "access problem" throughout the Article. The "access
issue" has been the focus of an extensive academic literature. See generally JAMES B. ATLESON, VALuEs AND ASSUMPTIONS IN AMERICAN LABOR LAW 60-62 (1983) (discussing the effects of common law
property concepts on unionization activities); THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 85-87 (Patrick Hardin et.
al. eds., 3d ed. 1992) (describing types of employer violations of restrictions on pre-election activities);
R. Wayne Estes & Adam M. Porter, Babcock/Lechmere Revisited: DerivativeNature of Union Organizer Right of Access to Employers' Property Should Impact Judicial Evaluation of Alternatives, 48
SMU L. REV. 349 (1995); Cynthia L. Estlund, Labor, Property, and Sovereignty After Lechmere, 46
STAN. L. REV. 305, 321 n.109 (1994) (discussing the circuit court conflict on the "salting" issue); ROBERT A. GoRmAN, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAW: UNIONIZATION AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 179-94
(1976); Sarah Kom, Property Rights and Job Security: Workplace Solicitation by Nonemployee Union
Organizers, 94 YALE L.J. 374 (1984); Randall White, Union Representation Election Reform: Equal
Access and the Excelsior Rule, 67 IND. L.J. 129 (1991) (arguing that giving union Excelsior list earlier
permits more employee contact).
2. National Labor Relations Act, Pub. L. No. 74-198, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (current version at 29
U.S.C. §§ 141-87 (1988)).
3. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1988).
4. "The right of self-organization depends in some measure on the ability of employees to learn
the advantages of self-organization from others." NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105, 113
(1956).
5. See Estlund, supra note 1, at 315. See also Larry Cohen, Overcoming Negativism: The Mission Statement in Union Organizing, in INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS RESEARCH ASSOCIATION, PROCEEDINGS
OF THE FORTY-NINrH AN NUAL MEETING, 72-78 (Paula B. Voos ed., 1997) (suggesting that, in attempting to organize, unions articulate a positive vision for change, instead of merely reacting to problems
generated by management).
6. This concern was recognized earlier in the legislative debates over the original NLRA. Senator Wagner, the bill's chief sponsor, noted: "No sensible person would interpret that language [of section
71 to mean that while a factory is at work the workers could suddenly stop their duties to have a mass
meeting in the plant on the question of organization." 79 CONG. REC. 7676 (1935). The Court also has
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tion, any expansion of the rights of unions and employees to enter the workplace and communicate their message to potential members results in an
intrusion on the rights of private employers to have control over their
property. 7
As the result of this difficult clash of policy priorities, the Board and
the courts have struggled to develop a coherent policy concerning the "access" question. This article looks at the development of the law in this very
contentious area. We argue that while this is certainly a difficult problem,
the Court and the Board have made it a much more complex issue than
necessary. We argue that there have been two basic flaws in the Court's
treatment of the "access problem." First, decision-makers have failed to
comprehensively deal with the access problem.8 Over the years, the courts
and the Board have dealt piecemeal with various aspects of this problem
without attempting to develop a coherent framework. This disjunction has
most recently been illustrated in Court's decisions dealing with the definition of the term "employee" under the Act.9 Second, the Court, and to
some extent the Board, has not analyzed the access issue within the context
of today's workplace.1 ° The Court has been "stuck" in its understanding of
the dynamics of the workplace and of workplace behavior, exhibiting a
frame of mind that is more representative of the 1940's and 50's than of
today's workplace in its understanding of the dynamics of the workplace
and of worker behavior. This article provides a new perspective on the access problem and the Court.
Part II describes and analyzes the development of the law concerning
the access problem." We examine the historical development of the law
concerning employee access, from the initial distinctions of work time/nonwork time, and employee/non-employees, to the recent decisions concerning salting. Part III identifies two basic problems in the access problem
jurisprudence.' 2
In Part IV, after identifying what we believe is the doctrinal problem in
the development of the case law concerning the access problem, 3 attention
recognized this tension and its importance to the development of labor law. "These cases [Republic
Aviation and Le Tourneau] bring here for review the action of the National Labor Relations Board in
working out an adjustment between the undisputed right of self-organization assured to employees under
the Wagner Act and the equally undisputed right of employers to maintain discipline in their establishments." Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793, 797-98 (1945).
7. See Dianne Avery, Federal Labor Rights and Access to Private Property: The NLRB and the
Right to Exclude, 11 IND. REL. L.J. 145, 223-27 (1989) (discussing the relationship between section 7
rights and property rights).
8. See infra notes 126-32 and accompanying text.
9. See Town & Country Electric Inc. v. NLRB, 516 U.S. 85 (1995). See also infra notes 92-98
and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 133-45 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 24-125 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 126-45 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 148-56 and accompanying text.
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turns to the theoretical issue of explaining why the Board and the Court
have applied a flawed approach to the access problem.' 4 We argue that the
problems in this area of law are rooted in a key component of the judicial
process in the United States, i.e., the doctrine of stare decisis."5 We argue
that the Board and Court's continued reliance on policy judgments they
made decades ago are responsible for the complex state of affairs in this
area of law. We turn to behavioral economics and decision making research to help us frame this problem. We find some partial answers in the
"escalation of commitment" perspective. In Part V, we comprehensively
analyze the access problem within an escalation of commitment
framework. 6
In Parts VI and VII we move back from the theoretical discussion to a
more doctrinal discussion. Our focus here is to identify possible solutions
to the access problem. We find an unlikely ally in our quest: the Supreme
Court. In a number of decisions over the last ten years, culminating with
the high-profile decision in Casey v. Planned Parenthood,7 the Court has
developed an approach to stare decisis which maintains the reliance on precedent while at the same time avoiding the decision-making flaws examined by the escalation of commitment research. Using this model, we
provide a road map to resolve the access problem.' 8 In Part VII we identify
the major components of a comprehensive model of reform which combines both the lessons of Planned Parenthoodon precedent and the lessons
of more than sixty years of industrial relations in the United States. Our
proposed reform looks at multiple aspects of the access problem. We propose the outlawing of salting in a manner similar to that advanced in a
recent congressional proposal. 9 Similarly, we suggest limits on unions visiting employees at their homes, in recognition of the need to protect employees' privacy interests."0 To balance the negative effects that these two
proposals are likely to have on the ability of unions to organize new employees, we also propose a number of other reforms. We recommend that
Congress reconsider expanding both the rights of unions under the Excelsior list doctrine, 2 ' as well as the rights currently afforded to off-duty employees regarding organizing activities.2 2 We also propose overruling the
Lechmere decision, at least with respect to "quasi-public" employer property such as retail store parking lots.23 In Part VIII we will summarize our
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

See
See
See
505
See
See
See
See
See
See

infra notes 157-73 and accompanying text.
infra notes 148-56 and accompanying text.
infra notes 174-203 and accompanying text.
U.S. 833 (1992).
infra notes 254-318 and accompanying text.
infra notes 254-77 and accompanying text.
infra notes 289-96 and accompanying text.
infra notes 297-308 and accompanying text.
infra notes 309-14 and accompanying text.
discussion infra Part VII.D.5.
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arguments and conclude. We argue that our proposals for reform provides a
vehicle for constructive discussions in this important area.
II.
THE ACCESS PROBLEM

A.

"In The Beginning": Republic Aviation, Babcock and NuTone

The rules governing labor organizing at the workplace are fraught with
an inherent tension between the rights of employees to "form, join, or assist
labor organizations" (under section 7 of the Act) and the rights of employers as property owners and managers. One of the key early cases addressing this conflict is the United States Supreme Court's 1945 decision in
Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB. 4 Republic Aviation drew a sharp distinction between workplace organizing during work time as opposed to
non-work time. The Court found non-solicitation rules to be presumptively
valid when applied to work time, while such rules were found to be presumptively invalid when applied to non-work time.
In Republic Aviation, the Court did not distinguish between employee
organizers and non-employee organizers. The Board subsequently afforded
both groups broad freedom to organize at the workplace during nonworking
hours. 26 However, eleven years later in NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co.,27
the Court sharply reversed the Board differentiating between the workplace
organizing rights of employees and non-employee or outside union
organizers.
The Court in Babcock held that employers were free to deny access to
their property and the workplace to outside, non-employee union organizers
so long as "reasonable efforts by the union through other available channels
of communication" would enable the union to reach employees with its
message.29 The Court in Babcock emphasized that a large percentage of the
company's employees lived in a nearby small town. As a result those employees were reasonably accessible to the union at their homes and through
other means, thus obviating the need for union access to employer
property.3 °
Republic Aviation and Babcock mean employers can develop general
rules prohibiting on-site solicitation by outside union organizers, and any
union solicitation during working time. These decisions do not address,
24. 324 U.S. 793 (1945).
25. See id. at 801-05 & nn.8, 10. See also Leonard Bierman, Toward A New Model For Union
Organizing: The Home Visits Doctrine and Beyond, 27 B.C. L. REv. 1, 3-8 (1985).
26.

See Jay Gresham, Still as Strangers:Nonemployee Union Organizers on Private Commercial

Property, 62 TEx. L. REv. 111, 117 (1983).
27. 351 U.S. 105 (1956).
28. See id. at 112-14.
29. Id.at 112.
30. See id. at 106-07.
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however, the question of how these rights might be impacted by an employer's decision to wage a vigorous campaign against a union at the worksite during working time. This question has arisen most frequently in the
context of an employer's decision to give a "captive audience" speechi.e., an anti-union speech given to all gathered employees at the workplace
during working time. Various observers have characterized such speeches
as perhaps the most potent legal weapon in an employer's anti-union
arsenal.3
For this and related reasons, the Board has at times in the past found
such "captive audience" speeches to violate the Act32 or required employers
who choose to make such speeches to give the union the opportunity to
come onto company premises to reply. 3 3 Later Board cases, though, have
denied unions any workplace reply to employer speeches of this kind, 34 and
this latter approach was affirmed by the Court in its 1958 decision in NLRB
v. United Steelworkers (NuTone).35 In NuTone, the Court held that an employer can lawfully enforce a workplace no-solicitation rule against unions
while at the same time "violating" this policy by engaging in anti-union
solicitation at times and places prohibited by the rule. 3 6 The Court noted
that under the Act, unions have other available avenues of communication,
and they are not "entitled to use a medium of communication simply because the employer is using it."' 37 Significantly, Justice Felix Frankfurter,
writing for the Court in NuTone, noted that employers were not free to
implement rules in this manner where a substantial "imbalance in the opportunities for organizational communication" exists.3 8
B.

The "Home Visits" Doctrine

In the late 1950s, apparently responding to several of the Court's decisions limiting union organizational opportunities, developed its "home visits" doctrine. Under this doctrine, unions would continue to legally visit
employees at their homes. Employers are prohibited from engaging in this
method of campaigning.
The Board's differentiation between unions and employers in this regard rests on two prongs. First, the Board has found employer campaign
31. See Comment, Labor Law Reform: The Regulation of Free Speech and Equal Access in NLRB
RepresentationElections, 127 U. PA. L. REv. 755, 780 [hereinafter "Penn Comment"] (citing statement
by Professor Howard Lesnick); see also Robert Lewis, The Law and Strategy of Dealing with Union
Organizing Campaigns, 25 LAB. L. J. 42, 46 (1974).
32. See, e.g., Clark Bros. Co., 70 N.L.R.B. 802, 804-05 (1946), enforced, 163 F.2d 373 (2d Cir.
1947).
33. See, e.g., Bonwit Teller, Inc., 96 N.L.R.B. 608 (1951).
34. See, e.g., Livingston Shirt Corp., 107 N.L.R.B. 400 (1953).
35. 357 U.S. 357 (1958).
36. Id. at 358, 364.
37. Id. at 364.
38. Id. at 362.
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visits to employee homes to be per se coercive.39 The Board stated that

unions lack the employer's "control over tenure of employment and working conditions" of the kind which imparts the coercive effect to systematic
individual interviews.4"
Second, and far more significantly, the Board has also held that unions
should be allowed to visit employee homes while employers are not so permitted in order to offset the lack of union access to employees at the workplace and in other contexts.4 1 It is this latter prong concerning the need for
union home visits to offset employer organizational advantages which has
over time emerged as the major underlying theme of the "home visits"
doctrine.42
C. Excelsior/General Electric
The notion of union home visits as an "organizational counterbalance"
to employer advantages in reaching employees at the workplace was further
solidified by the Board in its famous 1966 holdings in the companion cases
of Excelsior Underwear, Inc.4 3 and General Electric Co.' In General
Electric, unions sought greater access to employees at the worksite, particularly the ability to respond directly to employer "captive audience"
speeches on company premises during paid time.45 In Excelsior, refusing
unions workplace access, the Board held that unions should be provided
with a list of names and addresses for all employees in the given election
unit within seven days of a representation election.4 6
The Excelsior decision was clearly intended to facilitate the ability of
unions to contact employees at home, thereby offsetting employer organizational advantages at the workplace. 47 Yet the question remains whether the
ability to engage in home visits really offsets employer communication advantages at the workplace. In General Electric, the Board ruled that
broader union organizational access issues should be deferred "until after
the effects of Excelsior become known."48 Yet, it is now over thirty years
since these cases were decided, and the Board has never squarely reconsidered this issue.
39.
40.
41.
42.

See Peoria Plastic Co., 117 N.L.R.B. 545, 547-48 (1957).
See Plant City Welding and Tank Co., 119 N.L.R.B. 131, 133-34 (1957).
Id. at 133.
See generally Bierman, supra note 25.

43.
44.

156 N.L.R.B. 1236 (1966).
156 N.L.R.B. 1247 (1966).

45.
46.

See id. at 1250.
See Excelsior, 156 N.L.R.B. at 1239-40.

47.
48.

See id. at 1246 n.27.
General Electric, 156 N.L.R.B. at 1251.
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Proposed Labor Law Reform Act of 1977-78

Congress did attempt to step into the breach left by the Excelsior and
General Electric cases in the proposed Labor Law Reform Act of 197778. 4 9 They introduced legislation which contained various proposals
designed to broaden union organizational access to employees.50 Among
these proposals was legislation which would have essentially overturned the
Court's decision in NuTone and provided outside union organizers with the
opportunity to respond at the worksite to all employer workplace anti-union
campaigning,5 1 as well as language permitting union workplace replies to
employer "captive audience" speeches.5" In tandem with these legislative
proposals calling for increased union access to employees, Republican
members of the House of Representatives offered an amendment to overrule
the Board's home visits doctrine and allow employers to campaign by visiting employees at their homes.5 3 Some House Democrats chastised this proposal as the "trick or treat" amendment,5 4 while other members of Congress
questioned whether either unions or employers should be permitted to campaign by visiting employees at their homes.5 Ultimately, the proposed
"home visits" amendment was tabled,5 6 and the legislation died on June 22,
1978 when Senate Democrats failed to break a filibuster by Senate
Republicans. 57
E. Lechmere
While the successful Senate filibuster put a temporary end to the discussion of union access in Congress, the issue surfaced once again before
the Court in the 1992 case of Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB.5" In Lechmere, a

union sought to organize employees of a large Connecticut retail store located in a "strip" shopping center surrounded by a parking lot co-owned by
the shopping center owner and the store.5 9 When the union's initial efforts
to reach employees by way of ads in the local n~wspaper proved unsuccessful, non-employee union organizers began passing out handbills in the store
parking lot.60 Lechmere's manager and security personnel told the union
49. See H.R. 8410, 95' Cong. (1977), reprinted in Labor Reform Act of 1977: Hearings on H.R.
8410 Before the Subcomm. on Labor- Management Relations of the House Comm. on Education and
Labor, 95th Cong. pt. 1, 5-6 (1977); S. 2467 9 5th Cong. (1978), reprinted in S. REP. No. 628, 95th
Cong., 23, 45-60 (1977); see also Bierman, supra note 25 at 20-22.
50. See Bierman, supra note 25 at 20-22.
51.
52.

See id.
See id.

53.
54.
55.

See id. at 22-23
Id.
See id. at 23.

56.

See id.

57.
58.
59.
60.

See
502
See
See

id. at 22; see also Penn Comment, supra note 31, at 795.
U.S. 527 (1992).
id. at 529.
id.
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organizers they were trespassing on private property, relegating them to a
grassy strip of public property between the parking lot and an adjoining
four lane public highway. 6' From this grassy strip, the union organizers
passed out handbills and recorded license plate numbers of cars parked in
the employee parking area of the Lechmere parking lot.62 The union apparently had a "mole" at the Connecticut Department of Motor Vehicles who
gave them the names and addresses of the individuals who owned these
cars. 63 The union was ultimately able to obtain the valid names and addresses of about twenty percent of the employees it was trying to organize
and to send
them mailings, call some on the phone, and make a few home
4
visits.

6

Ultimately, however, these organizing efforts failed and the union filed
an unfair labor practice charge with the Board, alleging that Lechmere's
refusal to allow it to organize in its parking lot violated the union's section
7 rights. 65 The Board upheld the union's complaint, applying a "balancing
test" which weighed the impairment of section 7 rights against the impairment of employer property rights. The Board found that denying the union
access to the parking lot would seriously impair section 7 rights because the
union's alternative organizing methods were "ineffective," "expensive," and
"unsafe." 6 6 The Board also found that granting such union access did not
substantially impair the company's property rights since the Lechmere
parking lot was "essentially open to the public," and the union's distribution
of leaflets was "unobtrusive.- 67 On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the First Circuit upheld the Board's opinion.6 8
The Court reversed. The opinion represented a very strong reaffirmation of its 1956 holding in NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co.,69 and Babcock's sharp distinction between the access rights of employees (who have
broad access) and non-employee/outside union organizers (who can generally be denied all access to employer property).7 °
Under Babcock, non-employee union organizers are denied all access
to employer property, except in the case where employees are completely
inaccessible through "usual channels. 71 In Lechmere, the Court interpreted
this exception to be an extremely narrow one, applying only to the "rare
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

See id. at 530.
See id.
See id.
See id.
Lechmere, Inc., 295 N.L.R.B. 15, 92 (1989).
Id. at 93-94.
Id. at 94.
Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 914 F. 2d 313 (1S"Cir. 1990).
351 U.S. 105 (1956); see supra notes 27-30 and accompanying text.
Babcock, 351 U.S. at 112-14.
Id.at 112.
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case" 72 where employees live at a mining or logging camp or a mountain
resort hotel and thus absolutely can not be reached by the union unless
union organizers come onto company property.7 3 In the instant case,
although employees lived in a large metropolitan area (greater Hartford,
Connecticut), they were not deemed completely "inaccessible." 7 4 Indeed,
the Court cited the union's ultimate success in reaching a substantial percentage of them "via mailings, phone calls and home visits" as well as other
methods.7 1 Consequently, Lechmere could legally bar the non-employee
union organizers from its parking lot and other property.7 6
F.

"Salting"

Frustrated by Lechmere in attempting to expand their organizing efforts, 7 7 unions began looking for solutions. The Lechmere decision essentially prevents non-employee union organizers from reaching employees at
the workplace. But what if union organizers apply for jobs at and "hire
into" targeted workplaces? These union organizers would then be "employees" and, consistent with the Court's holding in the Republic Aviation case,
would have broad rights to organize fellow employees at the job site during
non-working time. 78
Salting is among the most controversial current issues in the field of
employment law. The United States Chamber of Commerce recently surveyed readers of its national magazine and found that salting was the employment law issue they most wanted Congress to reform. 79 On March 26,
1998, by a vote of 202 - 200, the United States House of Representatives
passed legislation outlawing salting in small businesses.80 President Clinton, however, has threatened to veto this legislation. 8 ' This legislative attention has been sparked, in part, by the Court's 1995 decision on the topic
in NLRB v. Town & Country Electric, Inc.8 2 The issue also has begun commanding considerable attention in the scholarly community.83
72. Lechmere, 502 U.S. at 537.
73. See id. at 539.
74. Id. at 539-40.
75. Id.
76. See id. at 541.
77. See G. Pascal Zachary, Signs of Revival: Some Unions Step Up Organizing Campaigns and
Get New Members, WALL ST. J. Sept. 1, 1995 at Al.
78. See supra notes 24-26 and accompanying text.
79. See Reader's Views, NATION'S BusINEss, Dec. 1996 at 60 (magazine published by U.S. Chamber of Commerce for its members).
80.

See Jim Abrams, House Labor Bill Faces Presidential Veto, THE COMMERCIAL APPEAL,

March 27, 1998 at B7.
81. See id.; PR Newswire, March 19, 1998, (Clinton address to AFL-CIO executive council in Las
Vegas).
82. 516 U.S. 85 (1995).
83. See, e.g., Leonard Bierman & Rafael Gely, Salting the Contractors' Labor Force, 15 J. LAB.
REs. 309 (1994); Michael H. Gottesman, Union Summer: A Reawakened Interest in the Law of Labor?,
1996 Sup. CT. REV. 285; Susan E. Howe, Comment, To Be or Not To Be An Employee: That Is the
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As various observers predicted, 4 Lechmere has led to a sharp increase
in such union "hiring into" or salting of targeted workplaces.85 Employers
have responded to this activity either by refusing to hire or by firing individuals to the extent said employers become aware that these individuals
are paid union organizers trying to "salt" their workplace and workforce. 86
The Board, however, has viewed employee organizers, even if they are on a
union payroll, as "employees" entitled to the full protection of the Act, including its prohibition of employer discrimination against employees on the
basis of "union activity."'8 7 Some federal courts of appeals, though, refused
to uphold the Board's holdings in this regard, instead finding that salter's
divided loyalties left them without protection under the Act.8 8 In 1995, the
Court addressed the issue in the case of NLRB v. Town & Country Electric,
Inc.89

Union Access and Town & Country

G.
1. Overview

Traditionally, non-employee union organizers have been prohibited
from campaigning on employer premises, even when the employers have
used their premises to actively campaign against unions. The Lechmere
decision strongly reaffirms this proposition, extending the ban on union access to "quasi-public" property owned by employers, e.g., retail store parking lots generally open to the public.
To offset these access prohibitions, unions are afforded the opportunity
to visit employees at their homes, while such visits by employers are prohibited. The Court has also specifically upheld the right of unions to obtain
lists of employee names and addresses once a Board representation election
has been scheduled, in order to facilitate union home visits and other
Question of Salting, 3 GEO. MASON INDEPENDENT L. REv. 515 (1995); Philip A. Miscimarra & Andrew
W. Altschul, The Town & Country Case: Legal Issues and Implications, 18 J. LAB. R.S. 73 (1997);
Note, Organizing Worth Its Salt: The Protected Status of Paid Union Organizers, 108 HARV. L. REv.
1341 (1995).
84. See, e.g., Estlund, supra note 1, at 321 n. 109. See also Bierman & Gely, supra note 83, at
310.
85. See Gary E. Hess, Salting: An Industry Perspective, 18 J. LAB. Ras. 47 (1997) (discussing
negative effects of salting since the Town & Country decision); Michael D. Lucks, Salting and Other
Union Tactics: A Unionist's Perspective, 18 J. LAB RES. 55 (1997), Augustus T. White, Litigation:
Where Has It Been and Where Is It Taking Us?, 18 J. LAB. REs. 65 (1997); Miscimarra & Altschul,
supra note 83.

86. See Hearing on Oversight of the National Labor Relations Board: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations of the House Committee on Economic and Educational Oph

'

portunities, 1040 Cong., 1V Sess. at 75-79, 171.

87. See, e.g., Sunland Construction Co., 309 N.L.R.B. 1224 (1993); Town & Country Elec., Inc.,
309 N.L.R.B. 1250 (1992).
88. See e.g., Town & Country Elec., Inc. v. NLRB, 34 F. 3d 625 ( 8' Cir. 1994); Ultra Systems
th
Western Constructors, Inc. v. NLRB, 18 F. 3d 251 (4 Cir. 1994).
89. 516 U.S. 85 (1995).
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outside-of-work contact with employees.9" Finally, unions have started getting around the access bans facing non-employee union organizers by getting union organizers to apply for and obtain jobs at given worksites. By
"hiring into" these workplaces, these "salters" then officially become "employees," and are afforded broad rights to organize fellow employees at the
workplace. Salting thus allows union organizers to achieve through the
"backdoor" what Lechmere prohibits them from obtaining through the
"front door."

91

In its Town & Country decision, the Court resolved the conflict between the Board and some of federal appeals courts regarding whether
"salters" can be deemed "employees" entitled to the protection of the Act.9 2
The Court agreed with the Board that "salters" are indeed "employees"
under the Act.93 The Court noted that the Board's interpretation of the term
"employee" in this regard was consistent with the "broad language" of the
statute, and that it generally accords the Board considerable leeway in interpreting the Act.94 The Court expressly rejected the notion that "salters"
should not be protected under the Act because of potential disloyalty.95
The Court's decision in Town & Country is thus a quite narrow one,
focusing solely on the definition of "employee" under the Act. The Court
cited Lechmere only once, simply noting that employers "may as a rule
'
limit the access of nonemployee union organizers to company property. "96
The Court submitted that Lechmere and Town & Country would not conflict
if workers took a "Trojan horse" 97 approach. As on observer put it, the
Town & Country decision was "somewhat surprising after Lechmere." 98
2.

Employer Privacy and Property Rights

The Court's decision in Town & Country makes sense from the perspective of an overall "balancing" of union/management organizational
rights. Lechmere severely restricted union organizing rights in considerable
measure, relegating unions to making home visits and otherwise contacting
employees at their homes.9 9 As examined below,"° the home visits ap90.
91.
Bierman,
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

See NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759 (1969).
See Letter From Douglas E. Witte, Counsel for Town & Country Electric, Inc. to Leonard
Professor, Texas A&M University (February 20, 1995) (on file with Texas A&M University).
516 U.S. 85 (1995).
Id. at 87.
Id. at 90-91.
See id. at 95-96.
Id. at 97.
See Judd H. Lees, Hiring the Trojan Horse: The Union Business Agent as a ProtectedAppli-

cant, 42 LAB. L. J. 8, 14 (1991).
98. William R. Corbett, The "Fall" of Summers, The Rise of "Pretext Plus" and the Escalating
Subordination of FederalEmployment DiscriminationLaw to Employment at Will: Lessons from Mc-

Kennon and Hicks, 30 GA. L. REv. 305, 319 n.62 (1996).
99. See Leonard Bierman, Reply, Extending Excelsior, 69 IND. L. J. 521, 523-25 (1994).
100. See infra note 188 and accompanying text.
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proach is a difficult one for unions, and may sometimes intrude on employee privacy rights. Indeed, two years after Lechmere, in Department of
Defense v. FLRA (DOD)'0 the Court ruled that federal employee unions
were not entitled to listings of employee addresses on employee privacy
grounds. While decided under another statute' °2 and not applicable to private sector employees, 0 3 the decision raises an interesting challenge to the
Court's rationale in Lechmere. The Court noted, for example, that "many
people simply do not want to be disturbed at home by work-related matters"
and that it was "reluctant to disparage the privacy of the home which is
accorded special consideration" under our laws. t "n If Lechmere allowed
unions to make home visits, and if, according to DOD, unwanted home
visits are a bad thing, then salting is one of the remaining alternative ways
for unions to organize. The problem with salting is its high cost and limited
availability.
Arguably, salting burdens employer privacy and property rights. During the early years of the Act, employers got employees "hired into" positions in unions to collect information as spies or "moles." This was held to
be spying and industrial espionage, and outlawed under the Act.' 0 5 While
there are clear differences between "industrial espionage" aimed at union
prevention and salting aimed at union organization,10 6 salting raises some
of the same privacy problems. For instance, both industrial spies and salt510 U.S. 487 (1994).
102. The case was decided pursuant to the Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Statute, 5
U.S.C. §§ 7101-7135 (1988 ed. and Supp. IV).
103. DOD, 510 U.S. at 502-03.
104. Id. at 501. Interestingly, Justice Thomas authored both the Lechmere and Departmentof Defense opinions. In DOD, Justice Thomas appeared to have been substantially impressed by the privacy
concerns of the employees ("... it is clear that [the employees] have some nontrivial privacy interest in
nondisclosure, and in avoiding the influx of union-related mail, and, perhaps, union-related telephone
calls or visits, that would follow disclosure.") DOD, 510 U.S. at 501. This concern over employees'
privacy rights is curious for at least two reasons. First, Justice Thomas recognized that the Court's
decision created a situation under which public sector federal unions were being deprived of information to which their private sector counterparts were presumptively entitled. As Justice Ginsburg observed in her concurring opinion, this result is almost certainly contrary to any reasonable congressional
intent. See id. at 506 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). Second, while Justice Thomas appeared to have been
substantially concerned with the privacy rights of public sector employees in their homes, he evidenced
no such concern in Lechmere with respect to private employees. In Lechmere, Justice Thomas pointed
particularly to the ability of unions to reach employees at their homes as an alternative to workplace
contact. Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527, 540 (1992). Thus, the concern that was at least one of
the reasons that the dissemination of information was denied to the union in DOD was not much of a
concern in Lechmere.
105. See Fruehauf Trailer Co. v. United Auto. Workers Fed. Labor Union No. 19375, 1 N.L.R.B.
68, 73 (1935).
106. For example, one aspect of industrial espionage that was particularly damaging to unions, but
that does not appear to have a similar counterpart in the salting situation, is the fact that employers' spies
could participate in strategic planning by unions and alert the employer in advance. See KENNETH
GAGALA, UNION ORGANIZING AND STAYING ORGANIZED 27 (1983) (describing the problems industrial
espionage creates for unions).
101.
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ers are in a position to obtain information which they might not have gained
were their real identity known.
Employers and their advocates argue that the burdens of salting are
particularly harsh with respect to smaller employers that don't have the financial resources or the large legal and labor relations staffs to effectively
formulate policies and otherwise deal with salting. 0 7 For example, Gaylor
Electric Co., a fairly large electrical contractor in Indiana, reportedly budgets $250,000 a year for legal fees, mainly in opposition to salting decisions
by the Board.1" 8 These charges arise when an employer unlawfully fires,
disciplines, or refuses to hire "salters." The company's president, John
Gaylor, contends that the company has not been found liable for any unfair
labor practices with regard to taking an adverse employment action against
salters. He attributes this to the fact that "I can afford $175,000 in legal
fees.''" Mr. Gaylor also submits that some smaller non-union contractors
have been put out of business because they could not afford the legal fees to
fight salting.'11 Given this opposition, it is not surprising that the Chamber
of Commerce wants salting reformed 1 ' 'and supports legislation outlawing
this practice which recently passed the House of Representatives." 2
H.

The Newest Wrinkle: "Salting" and Striker Replacements

The latest chapter in the development of the case law concerning the
access problem further illustrates the complexity of this area of the law and
the need for a comprehensive approach to its resolution. Diamond Walnut
Growers, Inc. v. NLRB..' involved probably the two most contentious is-

sues in labor law over the last two decades: the access problem and striker
replacements.
Diamond Walnut arose out of an economic strike at a California walnut packing and processing plant. 1 4 Just about two years after the beginning of the strike, and a few weeks before a representation election to
determine if the union would maintain its exclusive representation status,' 15
the union notified the employer that four economic strikers wished to return
to work unconditionally.' 16 The strikers were reinstated and assigned to
seasonal positions, one as a packer, and the others cracking and inspecting
107. For an exhaustive list of eleven preventative steps employees should take in dealing with
salting, see Miscimarra & Altschul, supra note 83, at 84-87.
108. See Hess, supra note 85, at 50-51.
109. Id. at 51.
110. See id.
111. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
112. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
113. 113 F.3d 1259 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (en banc).
114. See id.at 1261.
115. The union had lost an earlier election, but after objections, the Board ordered a rerun election.
See id.
116. See id.
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walnuts. Two of the returning strikers had, however, previously held preferable positions. Nevertheless, the employer refused to hire them back to
their regular positions, raising concerns about employee safety and possible
sabotage."t During the following weeks, the reinstated strikers campaigned
for the union and monitored the activities of the employer, reporting to the
union attorney after each shift. 18 Following the election, which the union
lost, the returning strikers submitted letters of resignation and returned to
the picket line. The union then filed a complaint with the Board, arguing
that the employer had violated sections 8(a)(3) and 8(a)(1) of the Act by
unlawfully discriminating against the returning strikers. The complaint alleged that because of the employees' protected activity, the employer declined to put them in certain available seasonal positions for which they
were qualified, and which were preferable to the positions in which they
were actually assigned.1 19
The key issue before the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit was
whether the employer had a "legitimate and substantial" business justification for its decision to assign the returning strikers to "non-sensitive" positions."12 In its initial disposition of the case, the court examined the
reasoning behind the job placement of the returning strikers, noting the two
concerns the employer had advanced for its decision. First, the employer
had argued that the returning strikers represented a high risk of unrest, due
to the fact that earlier in the strike violence had erupted between the strikers
and the replacements. 2 1 Second, the court recognized the employer's fear
that returning strikers could engage in sabotage, product tampering, and
otherwise disrupt the company's operations.' 22 The court accepted these
two concerns, concluding that the employer had established substantial and
legitimate business justifications for its "seasonal" placement of the returning strikers.

123

In an en banc proceeding, however, the full D.C. Circuit recently vacated the three judge panel's initial judgment. The full court considered the
case of the two particular strikers involved independently. With respect to
one of the returning strikers, the court found that a generalized fear of violence or sabotage fails to constitute a legitimate concern. The court noted
that there will be some risk of sabotage or violence anytime a striker returns
to work while a strike is ongoing. Citing the Supreme Court's's decision in
Town & Country, the court noted that if an employee in such a situation
117. See id. at 1262.
118. See Diamond Walnut Growers, Inc. v. NLRB, 80 F. 3d 485,488 (D.C. Cir. 1996), vacated and
reh'g en banc granted, 88 F.3d 1064 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
119. 113 F.3d at 1262.
120. Id. at 1263.
121. 80 F. 3d 485, 491 (D.C. Cir. 1996), vacated and reh'g en banc granted, 88 F.3d 1064 (D.C.
Cir. 1996).
122. See id.
123. See id. at 492.
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engaged in sabotage, the employer would likely find out and could then
24
take disciplinary action. 1
With respect to the other returning striker, the court found that the
employer had legitimate business reasons for assigning him to a "non-sensitive" position. The en banc court noted that the position that this second
employee was seeking was that of quality control assistant. In that position,
the court concluded she would have had a special opportunity to commit
sabotage with little risk of detention. Because the sabotage could be committed with little risk of discovery, argued the court, the remedies contemplated in Town & Country would be inadequate, and thus it was proper for
12 5
the employer to take preemptive action against this particular employee.
Thus, employers are not able to discriminate against known "salters"
absent very strong justifications. Where jobs exist, and organizers might be
hired, salting affords unions opportunities for workplace access, even in the
context of reinstated economic strikers.
III.
WHAT IS WRONG WITH THE CURRENT APPROACH?

A.

Overview

The review of the case law concerning the access issue, and of the
various legislative efforts to deal with this issue, illustrates two basic flaws.
First, there has been very little effort to provide a framework that comprehensively relates the various aspects of the access problem. Second, the
Court has been particularly reluctant to reevaluate its prior decisions in the
access area in light of changes in the economic and social aspects of the
employment relationship that have taken place over the last forty-plus
years. In this section, we first discuss the two basic flaws that we see in the
approach the Court has developed to deal with the access problem. We
then introduce a theoretical framework to understand and resolve the
problems we believe afflict the law concerning workplace access.
B.
1.

The Basic Problem

Piecemeal Approach

Criticizing the Court for a piecemeal approach to solving the access
problem is somewhat unfair, in that the Court, as well as any other adjudi26
catory body, is constrained by the cases that are brought to its attention. 1
124.
125.

113 F. 3d 1259, 1266-67 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (en banc).
See id. at 1269.

126. See generally DoRIs PROVINE, CASE SELECTION IN THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 9-46
(1980); STEPHEN L. WASBY, THE SUPREME COURT IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM 163-78 (3d. ed.

1988). See also Rafael Gely & Pablo T. Spiller, A Rational Choice Theory of Supreme Court Statutory
Decisions with Applications to the State Farm and Grove City Cases, 6 J. LAW, ECON. & ORG. 263, 268
(1990) (analyzing the impact of case selection in the ability of the Court to choose policy outcomes).
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Both the facts of a case as well as the issues that the parties seek to litigate
are to some extent imposed on the Court.127 These constraints make it difficult for the Court in every case to make comprehensive policy statements
that are both consistent with prior rationales and responsive to the litigants'
concerns. Our criticism, however, is of a different kind. Our concern is
that the Court and the Board have failed to recognize how the different parts
of the puzzle fit together. This failure has been particularly pronounced in
more recent decisions, such as those involving the salting issue. As discussed above,' 28 the focus of the Court in its Town & Country decision was
quite narrow. The Court made only one reference to Lechmere, recognizing
that a possible inconsistency existed between the two cases. 129 The Court,
however, made no effort to explore an issue that was very ripe for analysis
- the role of salting within the access problem debate. Why are unions
130
engaging in what appears to be a fairly expensive organizing strategy?
By allowing salters to enter the workplace, and by protecting those individuals as "employees,"' 3 1 is not the Court undermining the rationale of Babcock, and the sharp employee/non-employee organizational distinction?
Moreover, Justice Frankfurter's opinion in NuTone seemed to mandate
Court examination of the overall "balance" of organizational
opportunity.'32
2.

Failing to Recognize the Changing Context

A second problem with the current approach to the access problem is a
failure to consider the issue in the context of the social and economic forces
facing workers today. 133 An important aspect of the early access cases de127. See WASBY, supra note 126, at 190-216.
128. See supra notes 89-98 and accompanying text.
129. See NLRB v. Town & Country Elec., Inc., 516 U.S. 85, 97 (1995).
130. We refer here to the costs, both direct outlays (e.g., paying the "salter") and the opportunity
costs of salting. see Michael D. Lucas, Salting and Other Union Tactics: A Unionist's Perspective, 18
J. LAB. RES. 55 (1997) (describing the development of "salting").
131. See generally NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105 (1956).
132. See generally NLRB v. United Steelworkers (NuTone), 357 U.S. 357 (1958).
133. Various key changes have been identified in the economics, industrial relations, and sociology
literature. Among those changes, the following are particularly relevant to the access problem. First,
there has been a growth of single-parent and dual-career families and an increase in labor force participation of mothers of young children. See Eileen Appelbaum & Peter Berg, Balancing Work and Family:
Evidence from Surveys of Manufacturing Workers, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE FORTY-NiNTH ANNUAL
MEETING OF THE INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS RESEARCH ASSOCIArION 115, 115 (Paula B. Voos ed., 1997)
(analyzing the factors influencing the choice of companies to provide family-friendly policies). For
example, between 1982 and 1993, the number of women in the U.S. civilian labor force increased
almost twice as fast as that of men. See Robert Drago, et. al., The Time Crunch and School Teachers, in
PROCEEDINGS OF THE FORTY-NINTH ANNUAL MEETING OF THE INDUSTRtAL RELATIONS RESEARCH Asso-

123, 123 (Paula B. Voos ed., 1997). Similarly, sixty-seven percent of mother of infants under
the age of three were on payrolls in 1991, and dual-earner status is the norm among families with
children. See id at 124. These changes have been identified as creating a particularly acute pressure on
the balancing of family and work responsibilities. See id. at 125. This suggests that with less time
available for family matters, employees are more likely to view the decreasing "family-time" as truly
CIATION
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cided by the Court, particularly Republic Aviation and Babcock, is the centrality of context in those holdings. In Babcock, for example, the Court
strongly considered the fact that employees lived in a nearby small town,
34
and were reasonably accessible to the union outside of the workplace. 1
Similarly, the "home visits" doctrine appears to be based on a model of
economic life that suggests that employees live in close proximity to the
workplace.1 35 Indeed, such demographic patterns provide a rationale for the
"home visits" rule. By granting unions the ability to access the employees
at their homes, the Board was in effect balancing out the limiting effects the
Babcock rule had earlier imposed on unions. 13 The "home visits" doctrine
only makes sense if such demographic patterns are controlling. However, if
employees are scattered over a wide geographic area, allowing access to
employees' homes hardly compensates for the denial of access to the workplace. Thus, whether the context has changed has great bearing on access
issues.
In Lechmere, by contrast, the Court flatly refused to consider the present day context in which the access question arose. The Court's refusal to
consider the changing context in which union organizing takes place today
is particularly troublesome given the fact that before Lechmere the Board
had dealt with the access problem in a manner that showed considerable
1 37
recognition of these changing contexts.
13 9
Two Board cases - FairmontHotel'3 8 and Jean Country - illustrate this approach. Devising a balancing test for access questions, the
Board in Fairmont specifically noted that an analysis of the section 7 rights
of employees was more complicated than an analysis of private property
rights. Analyzing private property rights requires the Board look at factors
such as the use to which the property in question was put, restrictions on
public access to the property, and the size and location of the property. On
private. See id. Second, there have also been changes in terms of geographical living patterns. With
advances in transportation technology and information technology, employees are less likely to be constrained to live close to their places of employment. See generally JULIET B. SCHOR, THE OVERWORKED
AMERICAN 33 (1994).

134. "The plants are close to small well-settled communities where a large percentage of the employees live. The usual methods of imparting information are available .... Though the quarters of the
employees are scattered they are in reasonable reach." NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105,
113 (1956).
135. "If, by virtue of the location of the plant and of the facilities and resources available to the
union, the opportunities for effectively reaching the employees with a pro-union message, in spite of a
no-solicitation rule, are at least as great as the employer's ability to promote the legally authorized
expression of his anti-union views, there is no basis for invalidating these 'otherwise valid' rules."
NLRB v. United Steelworkers of America (NuTone), 357 U.S. 357, 364 (1958).
136. See generally Bierman, supra note 25.
137. See Estlund, supra note 1, at 318-19. See also Rosemary M. Collyer, Union Access: Developments Since Jean Country, 6 LAB. LAW. 839, 839-43 (1990) (analyzing the case law development before
the Court's Lechmere decision).
138. 282 N.L.R.B. 139 (1986).
139. 291 N.L.R.B. 11 (1988), overruled by Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527 (1992).
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the other hand, analysis of section 7 rights requires a more comprehensive
analysis. This analysis should include an assessment of the following factors: the nature of the right asserted; the purpose of the exercise of section 7
rights; the situs; the intended audience; the relationship of the situs to the
target of the section 7 activity; and the manner in which the section 7 rights
were asserted. 140 While the Board in Fairmont specifically discarded the
consideration of alternative means of communication as part of this initial
balancing test, its description of the balancing test clearly indicates a need
to look at the context in which the access question is presented.
The Board broadened its consideration of the present-day context of
union organizing in Jean Country, making it patently clear that the changing context matters. In Jean Country, the Board considered whether it was
a violation of NLRA section 8(a)(1) for the owner of a shopping mall to
deny access to non-employee union organizers who were picketing a nonunion clothing store.14 1 The Board's decision in Jean Country emphasized
the importance of "balancing" employer property rights and the section 7
rights of unions and individual employees. 4 2 The Board then expanded on
Fairmont by specifically including the "availability of reasonable alternative means" factor as part of the initial balancing test.143 This requires the
Board to look at the demographic and living patterns of the intended audience of a union's message." In fact, following Jean Country, and until the
Court decision in Lechmere, the Board and the various courts of appeals
considering the issue engaged in comprehensive assessment of the availability of reasonable means for unions to reach their intended audiences.' 4 5
IV.
WHO OR WHAT IS TO BLAME?

The two flaws in the development of the law concerning the access
issue we identified in Part III raise serious concerns about the manner in
which courts decide cases. 146 Why did the Court overlook the changing

industrial relations environment in which union organizing occurs, rendering its access analysis myopic? Are there any structural or procedural decision-making obstacles that caused these deficiencies? In the next section,
we identify what we believe to be the potential cause of these decision140.
141.
142.

See Fairmont, 282 N.L.R.B. at 142.
See Jean Country, 291 N.L.R.B. at 11.
Id. at 12-14.

143.

See Collyer, supra note 137, at 843-44.

144. See id.
145. See Emery Realty Inc. v. NLRB, 863 F.2d 1259 (1988) (enforcing Board's order requiring
owner of building complex to allow nonemployee union representatives to distribute union handbills to
hotel employees on owner's property); Laborers' Local Union No. 204 v. NLRB, 904 F.2d 715 (1990)
(affirming Board's finding that employer had not violated the Act by denying access to nonemployee
handbillers engaged in an area standards picketing).
146. See supra notes 126-145 and accompanying text.
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making problems. We then briefly sketch the parameters of a theoretical
14 7
framework that we believe is useful in understanding these problems.
A.

The Culprit: Stare Decisis and Precedent

One of the most basic principles of common law legal systems in general and the American judicial system in particular is the notion that courts
ordinarily should follow precedent. 4 8 Under stare decisis, courts adhere to
precedent in deciding cases.' 4 9 This adherence has been justified on various grounds, ranging from issues of efficiency, limiting judicial power, and
resource allocation, to rationales based on equity and basic notions of
50
fairness. 1
Supporters of precedent have argued, for example, that given the limited resources available to the judiciary, and given that to reconsider each
case "from scratch" would place undue burdens on these limited resources,
the doctrine of stare decisis promotes judicial efficiency.' 5 ' Others have
argued that the use of precedent ensures that similarly-situated litigants will
be treated equally over time, and allows individuals to plan their affairs by
knowing the future legal consequences of their actions.' 5 2
Opponents of stare decisis have attacked the doctrine on various
grounds. Critics of precedent have argued that none of these justifications
are compelling enough to justify the adherence to precedent, and that the
goals of equity, efficiency, and consistency can be achieved through less
draconian principles. Opponents also point out that there are various costs
associated with adherence to precedent. These costs include, for example,
diminished flexibility and adaptability15 3 as well as inefficient decision-

147. For a detailed treatment of the theoretical framework described below see Rafael Gely, Of
Sinking and Escalating: A (Somewhat) New Look at Stare Decisis, 60 U. PIrr. L. REv. (forthcoming
1999).
148. See Larry Alexander, Constrained by Precedent, 63 S. CA.. L. REv. 3 (1989).
149. See Richard J. Pierce, Reconciling Chevron and Stare Decisis, 85 GEo. L.J. 2225, 2237
(1997). Professor Schauer describes the use of precedent as follows: "The previous treatment of occur-

rence X in a manner Y constitutes, solely because of its historical pedigree, a reason for treating X in
manner Y if and when X again occurs." Frederick Schauer, Precedent, 39 STAN. L. REv. 571, 571
(1987).
150. See Earl Maltz, The Nature of Precedent, 66 N.C. L. REv. 367, 368-72 (1988).
151.
See id. Justice Cardozo argued that "the labor of judges would be increased almost to the
breaking point if every past decision could be reopened in every case, and one could not lay one's own
course of bricks on the secure foundation of the courses laid by others who had gone before him."
BENJAMIN CARoozo, THE NATURE OF THE JuDIciA. PROCESS 149 (1925).
152. See Maltz, supra note 150, at 368.
153. See id.
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making.' 54 Opponents of stare decisis argue that these costs clearly outweigh the alleged social benefits of the doctrine.' 55
Arguing the merits of the use of precedent is beyond the scope of this
Article. The extent of our argument is that regardless of whether stare decisis is or is not a "good" idea, the Court's reliance on precedent helps us
understand the two flaws we identified in Part III concerning the case law
development of the access problem (i.e., a piecemeal approach by the
Court and the Board, and a failure to recognize the changing context of
industrial relations).' 5 6 Before we develop that argument, however, we provide a brief sketch of a theoretical framework that may be applied to understand our argument that reliance on the use of precedent is in part
responsible for the current state of the law in this area.
B.

Escalation of Commitment

Researchers in the decision-making sciences have for a long time identified a particular flaw in the way individuals make decisions. This "escalation of commitment" problem parallels our argument regarding the use of
stare decisis. Escalation of commitment refers to the tendency for decision
makers to increase their commitment to what objectively appear to be failing courses of action.157 Escalation situations occur both at the individual
as well as at the organizational level. Common examples of escalation
situations at the individual level include a decision to wait for a bus for a
period of time substantially longer than it would have taken to walk to a
destination,' 5 8 and decisions to put additional money into fixing a broken
car.' 59 At the organizational level, situations involving decisions to open
new plants, start new projects, and enter new markets, are all potential examples of the problem of escalation of commitment.' 6 °
What makes these situations fit the escalation of commitment prototype is the inability of individuals to reach a decision under the rational
model of decision-making. Under one rational model theory, a decision154. "If the best solution to today's case is identical to the best solution for tomorrow's different
but assimilable facts, then there is no problem. But if what is best for today's situation might not be best
for a different (but likely to be assimilated) situation, then the need to consider the future as well as the
present will result in at least some immediately suboptimal decisions." Schauer, supra note 149, at 589.
155. See id. at 368-72. See also Pierce, supra note 149, at 2237-48.
156. See supra notes 126-145 and accompanying text.
157. See Joel Brockner, The Escalation of Commitment to a Failing Course of Action: Toward
Theoretical Progress, 17 AcAD. MGMT. Rav. 39 (1992) (providing a review of the theoretical variations
on the escalation of commitment). See also JOEL BROCKNER & JEFFREY Z. RUBiN, ENTRAPMENT IN
ESCALATN'G CONFLICrS: A SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS 2-7 (1988) (reviewing escalation of com-

mitment research).
158. See Brockner, supra note 157.
159.

BROCKNER & RuBN, supra note 157, at 1-2.

160. See id. at 2-3. See also Jerry Ross & Barry M. Staw, Expo 86: An Escalation Prototype, 31
ADMIN. Sci. Q. 274 (1986) (analyzing the decision-making process by Canadian government authorities
with respect to Expo 86 as an escalation of commitment problem).
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maker should make decisions based on the comparison of marginal quantities. 161 That is, the decision-maker should only consider the future costs
and benefits of making a given choice. 162 Under this particular rational
model, any previous losses or expenses should not be considered, as they do
163
not affect the comparison of marginal quantities.
At the center of the escalation of commitment problem is the presence
of sunk costs. Sunk costs are to costs that have been incurred and that are
beyond recovery at the point in time when the decision is made.' 64 That is,
sunk costs may be conceptualized as a payment that was made in response
to an earlier decision. The payment could have been in the form of money,
but also in the form of time or effort. 165 Sunk costs are by definition constant and thus should not enter into decisions whether or not to continue a
previously chosen course of action.1 66 Once made, sunk costs should not
167
influence subsequent decisions.
Sunk costs arise in situations in which over time there are streams of
anticipated costs and revenues, that is, in multiple-decision or multiple
time-period situations.16 8 If the realization of costs and revenues occur at a
single decision point, there can be no sunk costs. Multiple time-period decisions have been characterized in the escalation literature as involving four
steps. First, decision-makers make initial determinations concerning allocation of resources, with the anticipation of attaining some goal. Second, decision-makers receive some negative feedback, either signaling that they are
engaged in a failing venture or that at least they have not yet attained their
goals. Third, the decision whether to continue the initial course of action is
taken under conditions of uncertainty with respect to whether or not committing more resources would bring about the desired result. Finally, and
very importantly, the decision-makers have a choice in deciding whether to
continue or withdraw from their initial course of action. In sequential deci161. See Carl A. Kogut, Consumer Search Behavior and Sunk Costs, 14 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG.
381, 382-83 (1990) (describing the rational decision-making process in the context of consumer
behavior).
162. See Donald E. Conlon & Howard Garland, The Role of Project Completion Information in
Resource Allocation Decisions, 36 ACAD. MoMr. J. 402 (1993) (analyzing the various determinants of
escalation of commitment situations).
163. See id. at 402.
164. See ROBERT H. FRANK, MICROECONOMICS AND BEHAVIOR 11-14, 231-32 (1991) (discussing
the sunk costs effect as a pitfall to rational decision-making).
165. See Howard Garland & Stephanie Newport, Effects of Absolute and Relative Sunk Costs on
the Decision to Persist with a Course of Action, 48 ORGANTZKDONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION
PROCESSES 55 (1991) (showing that relative rather than absolute magnitude sunk costs have a significant
impact on subjects' reported likelihood of escalation commitment).
166.

See id. at 56.

167.

See Kogut, supra note 161.

168. Gregory B. Northcraft & Gerrit Wolf, Dollars,Sense, and Sunk Costs: A Life Cycle Model of
Resource Allocation Decisions, 9 AcAD. MGMT. REV. 225, 226 (1984).
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sions, individuals often fail to disregard sunk costs, thereby engaging in
69
escalation of commitment. 1
C.

Behavioral Manifestations of Escalation of Commitment Situations

The effect of escalation of commitment is the continued adherence to a
prior decision on the grounds that changing a previously chosen course of
action will result in a loss of prior expenditures. This insistence continues
despite the fact that the decision-maker receives feedback indicating that
the initial decision resulted in some unanticipated outcome. This decisionmaking process is typically behaviorally manifested in two ways: failure to
account for all available information, and the tendency to decide issues
based on partial information. First, individuals engaged in escalation fail to
consider all the information available to them when making decisions. In
particular, decision-makers tend to ignore information that suggests that the
conditions under which the initial decision was made have changed. In
their analysis of the Long Island, New York Shoreham Nuclear Power
Plant, Professors Ross and Staw provide multiple examples of how the executives at the Long Island Lighting Company ignored detailed information
170
regarding new cost projections and projected electric demand needs.
This behavior resulted in their involvement in the project way beyond the
17
point when it would have been rational to quit. '
A second behavioral manifestation of escalation of commitment involves the tendency of the decision-maker to compartmentalize particular
aspects of a decision, without making an attempt to analyze the "big picture." For example, a major tenet of rational decision-making theory is that
wealth is fungible.172 An implication of the fungibility concept is that what
should matter to individuals are changes in total wealth, not changes in a
particular "account" of their total wealth portfolio (e.g., housing, food, education accounts). Decision-making researchers have found consistently,
169. See Conlon & Garland, supra note 162. To see the relationship between sunk costs and the
escalation problem, consider the following often-used thought experiment. Imagine you have just spent
$200 on a pair of dress shoes, finding out shortly after getting home that they are painfully tight. Even
after being broken in, the shoes continue to cause major discomfort. Should you continue wearing the
shoes, or should you give them away? What would your response be if you had not paid for the shoes,
but instead had gotten them as a gift? The choice under the rational response model will be to compare
the marginal costs and benefits of continuing wearing the shoes, without any attention being given to the
initial expenditure. However, experimental data confirms that individuals are more likely to choose to
continue wearing the shoes when they have paid for them, as opposed to situations in which the shoes
were a gift. Thus, the escalation problem is closely related to the tendency of individuals to consider
sunk costs in choices about future behavior. See FRANK, supra note 164, at 231-32.
170. See Jerry Ross & Barry M. Staw, Organizational Escalation and Exit: Lessons from the
Shoreham Nuclear Power Plant, 36 AcAD. MOMT. J. 701, 709-15 (1993).
171. Shoreham's cost, estimated to be $75 million when the project was announced in 1966, rose
over the next 23 years to a total of over $5 billion. The project was finally abandoned without ever
having begun operations. See id. at 701.
172. See FRANK, supra note 164, at 227-28.
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however, that individuals are likely to make decisions that can only be explained by reference to changes in individual accounts, not in total
wealth.' 73 Making decisions based on changes in the "balance" of a particular account is akin to making decisions based on partial aspects of the
decision, not on the overall gamut of issues involved in the particular
choice.
The two types of behaviors that are observed in individuals that engage
in escalation of commitment situations match the two flaws that we have
identified as existing in the development of case law on the access problem.
The Court's failure to recognize the changing context surrounding the access issue is a behavior similar to that of participants in decision-making
research who consistently ignore information that tends to contradict their
prior assumptions. Similarly, the Court's reluctance to comprehensively
deal with the "access" issue parallels the "mental accounts" explanation for
escalating-type behavior. The Court appears to be compartmentalizing the
"access" issue into various separate and unrelated dimensions, and thus failing to recognize the interrelationships among these various aspects.
V.
ANALYSIS OF THE ACCESS PROBLEM

A.

Overview

In this section we look at the access problem as an escalation of commitment problem. Using this structure, we identify the various aspects of
the case law dealing with the access problem that we believe fit the escalation of commitment framework.
Our basic argument can be summarized as follows. An analysis of the
case law development concerning union and employee access to the workplace reveals an increasing tendency to decide current disputes on the basis
of precedent, and an unwillingness to reconsider the totality of arguments
advanced on both sides of the dispute. Recent decisions, like Lechmere,
illustrate the Court's insistence on applying standards developed over forty
ago, and its unwillingness to reevaluate the impact of the changing context
upon those standards which currently are being applied. This reluctance, a
classic prototype of the escalation commitment problem, is startling given
173. Professors Kahneman and Tversky provide the following experimental demonstration. They
tell one group of people to imagine that, having earlier purchased tickets for $10, they arrive at the
theater to discover that they have lost them. Individuals in a second group are told to picture themselves
arriving at the theater to buy the tickets just to find out that they have lost $10 from their wallets. People
in both groups are then asked whether they will continue with their plans to attend the performance.
Since losing a $10 ticket has the same effect in terms of total wealth as losing a $10 bill, the rational
model will predict that individuals in both groups should make a similar decision. In repeated trials,
however, most people in the lost-ticket group say they would not attend the performance, while an
overwhelming majority in the lost-bill group say they would. See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman,
The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice, 211 SCIENCE 453, 457 (1981).
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the overwhelming amount of negative feedback that has followed the
Court's initial decisions in this area of labor law.
B.

The Initial Decisions: Republic Aviation and Babcock

The Court's decisions in Republic Aviation and Babcock & Wilcox can
be characterized as the initial decisions concerning the question of union
and employee access to the workplace for organizing efforts.' 74 A careful
reading of these two decisions reveals language and reasoning characteristic of an initial decision under the escalation paradigm. 75 For instance, in
both cases, the Court recognizes that the question they resolve is new and
requires assessment of a variety of relevant factors. 176 The Court also recognizes the uncertain nature of its task and, accordingly, defines a goal by
which to measure the success of task at hand. In Republic Aviation, for
example, the Court states:
The Wagner Act did not undertake the impossible task of specifying in precise and unmistakable language each incident which would constitute an
unfair labor practice ....Thus a 'rigid scheme of remedies' is avoided and

administrative flexibility within appropriate statutory limitations obtained to
accomplish the dominant purpose of the legislation. So far as we are here
concerned that purpose is the right
of employees to organize for mutual aid
1 77
without employer interference.
In Babcock & Wilcox, the Court similarly shows concern for defining
the appropriate goal of the legislation and the role of the Board and reviewing courts in achieving this goal. In the often-quoted passage, the Court
says: "Organization rights are granted to workers by the same authority, the
National Government, that preserves property rights. Accommodation between the two must be obtained with as little destruction of one as is consis1 78
tent with the maintenance of the other."'
Thus, in Babcock and Republic Aviation, the Court made clear assessments of the context in which its decisions were being rendered.
C. The Negative Feedback: Increasingly Clumsy Rules and
Legislative Efforts
With respect to the access problem, the negative feedback was communicated in two forms. First, the development of the doctrine by the
Board and lower courts became increasingly complex, and as recent decisions prove, contradictory. Second, further feedback was received by
means of serious legislative attempts to comprehensively amend the Act.
174.
351 U.S.
175.
176.
177.
178.

Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793 (1945); NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co.,
105 (1956).
For a discussion of the escalation paradigm, see supra notes 157-69 and accompanying text.
See Republic Aviation, 324 U.S. at 798; Babcock, 351 U.S. at 112.
Republic Aviation, 324 U.S. at 798 (citation omitted).
Babcock, 351 U.S. at 112.
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In the decades following the Republic Aviation and Babcock decisions,
the Board and reviewing courts set in motion the process of implementing
the rules and goals identified by the Court in these two seminal decisions.
As discussed in Part II, the Board first dealt with the issue of captive audience speeches.1 79 Originally, the Board found these speeches to be unlawful. Later, it required that employers who chose to make such speeches
give the union an opportunity to reply on the employer's property. A few
years later, the Board reversed this policy (that is, no longer required that
unions be given a chance to reply), and the Court approved this reversal in
its NuTone decision.180 Unlike later decisions in this area, the NuTone decision illustrates the Court's willingness to reconsider the principles and goals
established in earlier decisions in the context of the ever-changing industrial
relations environment. For example, in the majority opinion, Justice Frankfurter refuses to provide a "mechanical answer""'' with respect to the union
and employee access problem, and instead issues a reminder of the importance of continuing to reevaluate "the way in which the particular controversy arose."

18 2

The regulation of the access problem entered a new dimension a few
years later with the Board's development of the "home visits" doctrine and
the Excelsior lists requirement. The Board devised these two new doctrines
in order to compensate for the lack of opportunity of labor organizations to
gain access to the workplace. As discussed in Part II, the home visits doctrine allows unions to visit employees in their homes, without a corollary
right being afforded to employers. 183 Under the Excelsior list requirement,
unions are entitled, within seven days of the Board issuing a representation
election order, to obtain from the employer a list of names and addresses for
all employees in the given election unit. We have criticized these two doctrines as poor solutions to the access problem. As we discussed in Part
III,184 they are both cumbersome and basically ineffectual in achieving any
kind of parity with respect to reaching employees. The home visits doctrine, for instance, may raise issues concerning employees' privacy rights,
shifting to some extent to employees the burden of maintaining the Babcock
case's balancing of labor/management interests. The related Excelsior list
requirement has been criticized as ineffective, and as coming too late in the
election process to be very meaningful.
See supra notes 32-38 and accompanying text.
See NLRB v. United Steelworkers of America (NuTone), 357 U.S. 357 (1958).
Id. at 364.
182. Id. at 362. "For us to lay down such a rule of law would show indifference to the responsibilities imposed by the Act primarily on the Board to appraise carefully the interests of both sides of any
labor-management controversy in the diverse circumstances of particular cases and in light of the
Board's special understanding of these industrial situations." Id. at 362-63.
183. See supra notes 39-42 and accompanying text.
184. See supra notes 24-125 and accompanying text.
179.
180.
181.
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During the period between Babcock and Lechmere, the Court and the
Board received further feedback with respect to the effect that their rulings
on the access problem were having when, in the late 1970s, Congress
sought to comprehensively amend the Act. In the context of escalation
analysis, the congressional efforts in 1977-1978 are significant in that they
sent a message to the Court (and the Board) that continued reliance on the
rules and goals established in Republic Aviation and Babcock had become
so complex that there was a real need to review the problem anew.' 85 The
proposed legislation, for example, sought to allow broader access to union
organizers, especially when confronted with on-site employer anti-union
campaigning. Amendments were also introduced to review the home visits
doctrine, by allowing employers to campaign by visiting employees at their
homes. While there was, and still is, considerable debate over the soundness of all these measures, the debate that surrounded the congressional
effort certainly produced a much needed reassessment of the access problem. Unfortunately, as evidenced by more recent Court decisions, this
message did not reach the nation's highest court.
D.

Uncertainty: The Quandary of Property Rights and
Organizing Rights

Substantively, the access problem balances the property fights of employers and the rights of employees to organize and form labor organiza' the Court had set the judicial goal to be
tions. As discussed in Part ,86
that of accommodating the two "with as little destruction of one as is consistent with the maintenance of the other." '87 Almost by definition, this
area has inherent uncertainty. Any fine tuning between protecting the private property rights of employers, and the right of employees to organize,
will have to be continuously evaluated in the context of the particular circumstances, not only of the particular dispute, but also the general state of
industrial relations and the social context in which the dispute arises.
The same rationale which in the late 1950s might have justified the
Board's finding that union visits to employees' homes were not per se coercive (e.g., small community, minimal privacy invasion)' 8 8 might or might
not be present in the late 1990s. Similarly, while in the 1950s it was probably sound to assume that employees lived in fairly close proximity to the
workplace, and thus that there were alternative channels for unions to reach
employees in the community as well as at their homes, such an assumption
might be totally unfounded in the 1990s, in which long commutes are com185. Of course, the timing of the legislative push was also affected by political considerations.
With both Congress and the White House under the control of Democrats, labor saw this as a unique
opportunity for labor law reform. See Penn Comment, supra note 31, at 755-97.
186. See supra notes 24-125 and accompanying text.
187. NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105, 112 (1956).
188. See Estlund, supra note 1, at 331-32.
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mon to the American worker's experience. It is this constant change that
creates the uncertainty which makes an escalation situation so likely, and
which in turn forces the Court to be willing to reassess the rules governing
the union and employee access problem.
E. Real Choice: Lechmere and Town & Country
1. Background
In two recent decisions, Lechmere and Town & Country, the Court had
the opportunity to reevaluate various aspects of the access problem. Unfortunately, it appears that in Lechmere the Court disregarded this opportunity,
choosing instead to decide the case primarily on the rationale and analysis
of a forty-plus year-old case189 and without any serious attempt to analyze
the case with an eye on the future impact of the decision. 9 ° Similarly, in
Town & Country, the Court, while willing to consider a broader set of factors in clarifying the meaning of the term "employee" under the Act, did not
raise the level of analysis to that necessary to de-escalate the problems created by its prior decisions.
2.

Lechmere

The Lechmere decision relied heavily on the Court's prior 1956 Babcock & Wilcox decision. Almost half of the Court's opinion is devoted to a
very detailed description of the facts of the Babcock decision 19 ' and of the
way Babcock had been interpreted in subsequent, yet marginally related,
Court decisions.19 After this long recanting of Babcock, the Court starts its
analysis with the following quote from an earlier decision: "Once we have
determined a statute's clear meaning, we adhere to that determination under
the doctrine of stare decisis, and we judge an agency's later interpretation of
the statute against our prior determination of the statute's meaning."' 93
This quote illustrates the sunk cost character of relying on precedent.
The parameters of the Court's analysis entail a retrospective, rather than a
prospective, mode of analysis.
The Court then went on to argue that the Babcock decision provided
the necessary tools for deciding the dispute in Lechmere. In particular, the
Court noted that under Babcock, the only exception to the rule that nonemployee organizers do not have any right to enter the workplace is where
189. See Babcock & Wilcox, 351 U.S. at 105.
the Court's
190. As the dissenting opinion of Justice White points out in Lechmere, .....
fails to recognize that Babcock is at odds with the current law of deference to administrative
and compounds that error by adopting the substantive approach Babcock applied lock, stock,
rel." Lechmere v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527, 546 (1992).
191. See id. at 531-35.
192. See id.
193. Id. at 536-37 (quoting Maislin Industries, U.S., Inc. v. Primary Steel Inc., 497 U.S.
(1990)).
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"the location of a plant and the living quarters of the employees place the
employees beyond the reach of reasonable union efforts to communicate
with them . ..."194 The Court then cited as classic examples cases where

employees will be beyond the reach of reasonable union efforts situations,
like logging camps, mining camps, and mountain resorts. 9 5 Even if the
Court was correct in arguing that Babcock stands for the proposition that
only in those situations will access be permitted, it is difficult to argue that
such examples are to a large extent characteristic of the 1990s industrial and
social context of the dispute the Court faced in Lechmere. The Court appeared to be deciding Lechmere, not only bound by the rule and rationale
provided in Babcock, but also on the basis of a contextual view of industrial
relations completely inappropriate given the period in which the case arose.
Justice White's dissenting opinion captures the essence of this argument:
If the Court in Babcock indicated that nonemployee access to a logging
camp would be required, it did not say that only in such situations could
nonemployee access be permitted. Nor did Babcock require the Board to
ignore the substantial difference between the entirely private parking lot of a
secluded manufacturing plant and a shopping center lot which is open to the
public without substantial limitation. Nor indeed did Babcock indicate that
the Board could not consider the fact that employees' residences are scattered throughout a major metropolitan area; Babcock itself relied on the fact
that the employees96in that case lived in a compact area which made them
easily accessible.'

In Lechmere the Court bases its decision on a set of assumptions about
industrial relations which is more in tune with the 1950s than with the
1990s.' 97 Like decision-makers engaged in escalation situations, the Court
fails to consider the nature of the current environment in evaluating whether
to follow a previously chosen course of action.
As we discussed earlier, 19 8 the practical response to Lechmere was, or
should have been, clear to the Court. With very few options available, unions post-Lechmere turned to organizing practices like salting, that are cumbersome and potentially more intrusive of both employer's business and
property rights than union organizers "trespassing" in a shopping mall's
public parking lot.

194.

Babcock & Wilcox, 351 U.S. at 113.

195. Lechmere, 502 U.S. at 539.
196. Id. at 543.
197. The Lechmere decision has also been explained as the product of Justice Thomas' view of the
primacy of property rights over the statutory rights created under the Act. See generally Leonard Bierman, Justice Thomas and Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB: A Reply to ProfessorRobert A. Gorman, 10 HOFsTRA LAB. L. J. 299 (1992).
198. See supra notes 77-89 and accompanying text.
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Town & Country

Compared to Lechmere, the Town & Country decision' 9 9 avoids the
escalation commitment decision-making process. Unlike the Court in Lechmere, the unanimous Town & Country decision shows a willingness to

reevaluate the issue at hand, i.e., whether a worker can be a company's
"employee" within the terms of the Act if, at the same time, a union pays
that worker to help organize the company, without giving undue weight to
precedent. 2" The Court, for example, focuses on the purposes of the Act,
and discusses how a broad definition of the term "employee" appears to be
consistent with achieving Congress' intent.2 0 1 The Court also discusses at
length the effects which salters could have on the employer's business
operations. 202
Thus, given the above escalation analysis, the Court's decision in
Town & Country is a vast improvement over the Lechmere decision. The

decision fell short of serving a model of de-escalation, in that it failed to
consider the question of the definition of the term "employee" in the
broader context of the law concerning union and employee access to the
workplace for organizing purposes. Our concern is that it will likely motivate more unions to engage in behavior like salting, which, as previously
noted, is costly and may be ineffective. 20 3 The access problem requires a
comprehensive approach one dealing not only with salting, but also with
issues such as non-employee access, home visits, Excelsior lists, and offduty employee rights.
VI.
PLANNED PARENTHOOD AND DE-ESCALATING THE

"ACCESS" PROBLEM

A.

Overview

Our argument up to this point can be summarized as follows. First, we
aver that there are some serious doctrinal problems with the legal rules concerning the access problem. In particular, we argue that an analysis of the
access problem case law reveals that courts have been unwilling to evaluate
the access problem in light of the changing industrial relations environment, 2° and that they have failed to deal with the access problem in a
199. NLRB v. Town & Country Elec., 510 U.S. 85 (1995).
200. In fact, unlike in Lechmere, there was not much case law, and for that matter, no real precedent on the issue before the Court. This supports our argument that, unhindered by precedent, the Court
was able to strike a better balance between the competing interests and make a proper analysis based
on a realistic and current view of the situation.
201. See Town & Country, 516 U.S. at 90-91.
202. See id. at 93-97.
203. See supra notes 77-125 and accompanying text.
204. See supra notes 126-32 and accompanying text.
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comprehensive manner."' We attribute both of these flaws in part to the
doctrine of stare decisis.2 °6 Second, we note that these problems are not
unique to the judicial decision-making process, but are common to sequential type decision-making. 0 7 Using the escalation of commitment framework, we identify the underlying aspects of the access problem. 208
In order to complete our analysis, we now provide a potential solution
to the problem we have identified. In this part of the Article, we look,
paradoxically, to the Court for guidance. We discuss a model of stare decisis which the Court has developed in the last decade. This model, we argue,
can be used by the Court to justify abandoning the precedents that have
forced it into this "complexity comer." This contemporary model of stare
decisis provides support for the argument that the Court should look at the
changing industrial relations environment, and that it should attempt to deal
comprehensively with the various aspects of the "access" problem. In Part
VII we provide the contours of a comprehensive solution to the "access"
issue which is consistent with the Court's guidance on the use of stare
decisis.2° 9
B.

Planned Parenthood and Stare Decisis

Although a unified approach to precedent has been a topic of discussion at the Court for many years, 21 0 the last ten years have seen increased
interest in such an endeavor.21 1 Various Justices have attempted to provide
some guidance regarding the proper use of stare decisis in the context of
statutory, constitutional and common law disputes. Unfortunately, given
the "spasmodic way" in which the Court has manipulated stare decisis, 21 2 it
is not clear whether the Court is serious about its new approach. It is not
certain whether it will apply this new approach consistently. 21 3 Because the
new model of stare decisis may provide significant guidance with the "access" issue, it warrants closer examination.
The most extensive discussion of stare decisis provided by the Court
over the last decade took place in the controversial Planned Parenthood v.
205.
206.
207.

See supra notes 133-45 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 146-56 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 157-73 and accompanying text.

208.
209.

See supra notes 174-202 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 254-318 and accompanying text.

210.

See generally Maltz, supra note 150, at 367.

211. See Todd E. Freed, Comment, Is Stare Decisis the Lighthouse Beacon of Supreme CourtJurisprudence?: A Critical Analysis, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 1767 (1996); Amy L. Padden, Note, OverrulingDecisions in the Supreme Court: The Role of a Decision's Vote, Age, and Subject Matter in the Application

of Stare Decisis After Payne v. Tennessee, 82 GEo. L.J. 1689 (1994).
212. See Freed, supra note 211, at 1778.
213. Various commentators have noted how, over time, the doctrine of stare decisis has been supported or abandoned as a matter of political expediency. In the 1960s, for example, conservatives facing
a liberal Court attacked the inclination of the Court to overrule precedent. By contrast, liberals now
facing a conservative Court are quick to criticize it for failing to adhere to precedent. See id. at 1779.
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Casey decision.21 4 In Planned Parenthood,the Court was confronted with
the issue of the constitutionality of a Pennsylvania statute imposing a
number of restrictions on women seeking abortions. 2 t5 As evidenced by
the opening sentence of Justice O'Connor's opinion,21 6 a major theme of
the decision was to resolve the doubt and confusion concerning a woman's
constitutional right to terminate her pregnancy, which the Court had recognized some 19 years earlier in Roe v. Wade. 2 7 The Court clarified its position on stare decisis en route to its reaffirmation of the central holding of
Roe v. Wade. 1 8 In Planned Parenthood, stare decisis served as one of

Justice O'Connor's justifications for the Court's upholding of the core of
Roe. Notably, Justice O'Connor's opinion would provide the basic model
of stare decisis used by the Rehnquist Court.
The joint opinion began by pointing out that the obligation to follow
precedent is not absolute. 2 9 The opinion noted the outer limits of the doctrine. On the one hand, efficiency and consistency arguments make precedent indispensable.22 ° On the other hand, precedent would seem
dispensable when "a prior judicial ruling should come to be seen so clearly
as error that its enforcement was for that very reason doomed."22 The
opinion went on to describe the four "pragmatic considerations" which
courts should use to decide when to overrule or reaffirm a prior case:2 22 (1)
whether the rule has proven to be intolerable simply in defying practical
workability; 223 (2) whether the rule is subject to a kind of reliance that
would lend a special hardship to the consequences of overruling and add
inequity to the cost of repudiation; 224 (3) whether related principles of law
have so far developed as to have left the old rule no more than a remnant of
abandoned doctrine; 225 and (4) whether facts have so changed, or come to
214. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
215. See id. at 844.
216. "Liberty finds no refuge in a jurisprudence of doubt." Id.
217. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
218. Planned Parenthood,505 U.S. at 846. According to Justice O'Connor's decision, the central
holding of Roe v. Wade was threefold. First, a woman has the right to choose to have an abortion before
viability and to obtain it without undue interference from the State. Second, the State has the power to
restrict abortions after viability. Finally, the State has legitimate interests from the outset of the pregnancy in protecting the health of the woman and the life of the fetus. See id. See also John Wallace,
Stare Decisis and the Rehnquist Court: The Collision of Activism, Passivism, and Politics in Casey, 42

BuFF. L. REv. 187, 209-11 (1994).
219. "The obligation to follow precedent begins with a necessity, and a contrary necessity marks its
outer limit." Planned Parenthood,505 U.S. at 854.
220. "With Cardozo, we recognize that no judicial system could do society's work if it eyed each
issue afresh in every case that raised it." Id. (citation omitted). "Indeed, the very concept of the rule of
law underlying our own Constitution requires such continuity over time that a respect for precedent is,
by definition, indispensable." Id.
221. Id.
222. Id. at 854-55.
223. See id.at 854.
224. See id.
225. See id. at 855.
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be seen so differently, as to have robbed the old rule of significant application or justification.22 6
1.

Workability

The first consideration in deciding whether to follow or overrule precedent is whether the rule established in a prior case has proven unworkable. Justice O'Connor's joint opinion appears to define workability in
required courts to undertake tasks outside
terms of whether the prior 22rule
7
their realm of competence.
The joint opinion also cited approvingly the Court's decisions in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority228 and Swift & Co. v.
Wickham.229 Garciaand Swift define workability not only in terms of judicial competence, but also in terms of the actual effects of the prior ruling.
In particular, workability requires an examination of whether the prior ruling has produced inconsistent results in its application, 230 and whether the
ruling has produced "mischievous consequences" to litigants and courts
alike. 23 '
Finally, workability also has been defined in terms of the relationship
between the precedent is construction of a statute and other relevant statutes. In Patterson v. McLean Credit Union,232 for example, the Court noted
that a prior ruling would be found to be unworkable to the extent that it
''poses a direct obstacle to the realization of important objectives embodied
in other laws."2 33
2.

Reliance

In deciding whether to adhere to a prior ruling, courts should also consider the cost of repudiating the rule to "those who have relied reasonably
on the rule's continued application."2'34 This second argument is the basic
reliance argument normally advanced as a justification for stare decisis.2 35
226. See id.
227. In finding that Roe has not proven unworkable, Justice O'Connor noted that while Roe required courts to assess state laws affecting the exercise of the choice to terminate a pregnancy, such
determinations were "within judicial competence." See id.
228. 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
229. 382 U.S. 111 (1965).
230. In Garcia,for example, the Court pointed out that the application of National League of Cities
v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), requiring the Court to decide whether a particular governmental function
was integral or traditional and thus immune from particular federal regulation, was inconsistent with the
principles of federalism. See Garcia, 469 U.S. at 531 (overturning National League of Cities).
231. See Swift & Co. v. Wickham, 382 U.S. 111, 116 (1965).
232. 491 U.S. 164 (1989).
233. Id. at 173.
234. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 855 (1992).
235. See Maltz, supra note 150, at 368 ("In planning their affairs, it is argued, people should be
able to predict the legal consequences of their actions. Such predictability can only be obtained if judges
can be expected to follow precedent in making their decisions.").
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In Planned Parenthood,Justice O'Connor provides a useful summary of the
relevant considerations in assessing the reliance factor.
The joint opinion starts its discussion of reliance by pointing out that
the reliance argument is to a large extent context-specific. Reliance, according to the joint opinion, will weigh more heavily in the commercial
context, i.e., in cases involving property and contract rights,2 36 where "advance planning of great precision is most obviously a necessity. "237 On the
other hand, in other contexts, such as cases involving procedural and evidentiary rules, the reliance argument will be of a lesser significance. 38
The O'Connor opinion goes on to argue that reliance should be
broadly defined. Justice O'Connor first conceded that since abortion could
be seen as an "unplanned response to the consequence of unplanned activity," a reliance claim appeared to be fairly weak.239 Justice O'Connor,
however, argued that the reliance argument should be defined more broadly
to include consideration not only of "specific instances of sexual activity,"240 but also the role that Roe has played in other areas. In particular,
Justice O'Connor pointed out two key developments. First, for over two
decades people had organized intimate relationships and made choices that
defined their views of themselves and society in reliance on the availability
of abortion.2 4 1 Second, the decision in Roe and the ability that it provided
women to control their reproductive lives had impacted substantially the
"ability of women to participate equally in the economic and social life of
the Nation. 24 2 Both of these factors, concluded Justice O'Connor, should
be factored in the reliance argument, since they are evidence of the way
individuals have ordered their thinking and living around the rule established by Roe.
3.

Intervening Developments in the Law

The decision whether to adhere to precedent will also be affected by
the extent to which related developments in the law have either removed or
weakened the conceptual underpinnings from the prior decision.24 3 The
court should assess whether later developments have rendered the prior decision irreconcilable with competing legal doctrines or policies. 244 The focus of the inquiry here is on legal developments related to the precedent
case. It is not clear whether "the intervening developments in the law"
factor encompasses only the decisional law of the Court, or whether it also
236.
237.

See Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 828 (1991).
Planned Parenthood,505 U.S. at 856.

238.

See Payne, 501 U.S. at 828.

239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.

Planned Parenthood,505 U.S. at 856.
Id.
See id.
Id.
See Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 173 (1989).
See id.
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encompasses decisions by lower courts and or actions by the legislature.24 5
The Court originally defined intervening developments only in terms of its
own decisions. 246 However, in its 1995 Hubbard v. United States decision, 247 a plurality of the Court defined the intervening developments somewhat more broadly, examining its own and lower court decisions as well as
actions of Congress.
4.

Changed Facts and Perceptions

In her joint opinion in Planned Parenthood, Justice O'Connor stated
that the decision to follow precedent will depend in part on "whether facts
have so changed, or come to be seen so differently, as to have robbed the
old rule of significant application or justification." '4 8 This fourth factor
appears to require the decision-maker to evaluate two different aspects of
the initial decision. First, it requires an evaluation of the factual background supporting the prior ruling. Second, it goes further by permitting
the decision-maker to evaluate not only factual changes, but also society's
perceptions of those changes.
With respect to the first element, consideration of changed facts, the
decision-maker is asked to inquire about the factual assumptions underlying
the prior ruling and decide whether changes in the landscape of potential
relevant facts challenge the central holding of the prior ruling. 24 9 The second element is somewhat different in that it allows the decision-maker to
inquire not only about factual changes, but about society's interpretation of
those changes. In a case decided just a couple of years before Planned
Parenthood,the Court, described this element as follows: "[i]t has sometimes been said that a precedent becomes more vulnerable as it becomes
to be inconoutdated and after being 'tested by experience, has been found
' 250
sistent with the sense of justice or with the social welfare.'
In short, in deciding whether to follow precedent, courts should look at
the factual context in which the prior ruling arose, with a view towards
evaluating whether the circumstances have so changed, or have come to be
seen so differently, as to justify a refusal to follow the prior ruling.
245. See id. See also Freed, supra note 211, at 1782-90.
246. See, e.g., Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989);
Andrews v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 406 U.S. 320 (1972).
247. 514 U.S. 695 (1995).
248. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 855 (1992).
249. In Planned Parenthood,for example, while admitting that technological changes in maternal
and neonatal health care have changed since the Roe's decision, Justice O'Connor concluded that those
changes did not affect the central ruling in Roe, "that viability marks the earliest point at which the
State's interest in fetal life is constitutionally adequate to justify a legislative ban on nontherapeutic
abortions." Id. at 860.
250. Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 174 (1989) (citing Runyon v. McCrary, 427
U.S. 160, 191 (1976) (quoting B. CARDOZO, THE NATuRE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 150 (1925))).
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C. Implications from Planned Parenthood
While Planned Parenthoodwas decided after Lechmere and obviously
could not have been cited in the Court's opinion, it is somewhat puzzling
that there is no mention in Lechmere about the Court's new approach to
precedent. Although Planned Parenthoodprovides the clearest description
of this model, the various components of the model had all been discussed
in earlier Court decisions. Yet the Court disregarded its own advice, choosing instead to base its Lechmere decision on a rigid adherence to precedent.
A persuasive argument can be made that if the Court would have considered Lechmere in the context of its new model of stare decisis, a very different result could have resulted.
Of the four factors that the Planned Parenthood decision proposes
should be considered by the Court when deciding whether to follow precedent, three of them support a decision to change the access rules. The
workability, intervening developments of the law, and changed facts and
perceptions factors are consistent with moving away from Babcock and towards a new approach to the access problem.
As argued earlier,2 5' one of the central problems with the law concerning the access problem is the complexity that the initial decisions in Republic Aviation and Babcock have generated. While implementing Babcock is
not per se an unworkable task, the Court and the Board quickly recognized
that the Babcock decision had significant implications in other areas. In
order to compensate for the limited access to the workplace created under
Babcock, the Board devised the home visits and Excelsior lists doctrines.
As discussed in Part V,252 these doctrines became increasingly unworkable
and ever less effective, and have been criticized as poor solutions to the
access problem.
The "intervening developments in the law" factor also supports the
argument for abandoning the Babcock approach. In addition to the case law
developed since Babcock concerning the home visits doctrine and the Excelsior doctrine, two other recent cases illustrate the application of this factor. The Court's "salting" decision in Town & Country raises a significant
conflict with both Babcock and Lechmere. One of the underlying principles
of both Babcock and Lechmere is the ability of employers to keep absolute
control over their private property. Town & Country appears to challenge
that premise, at least indirectly, by allowing union organizers to achieve
through the back door what Lechmere prohibits them from obtaining
through the front door. A similar conflict is raised in the Diamond Walnut
case decided by the D.C. Circuit, which upheld the ability of unions to
251.
252.

See supra notes 179-85 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 174-203 and accompanying text.
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engage in salting in the context of striker replacements.2 5 3 The Court of
Appeals holding not only expands the potential implications of salting, but
also raises a potential conflict between the law with respect to striker
replacements and the law regarding the access problem.
Under the intervening development factor, the court should assess
whether later developments have rendered the prior decision irreconcilable
with competing legal doctrines or policies. The focus of the inquiry here is
on legal developments related to the precedent case. The recent decisions
in Town & Country and Diamond Walnut arguably are beginning to make

patently clear the doctrinal conflicts embedded in the current approach to
the access issue.
An argument can also be made that the changed facts and perceptions
element requires the decision-maker to inquire about the factual assumptions underlying the prior ruling, and decide whether changes in the landscape of potential relevant facts challenge the central holding of the prior
ruling. There can be little doubt that the factual assumptions supporting the
Babcock approach to the access issue have all but vanished in the workplace context of the 1990s. In particular, a key factual consideration in
Babcock was the understanding that in only a limited number of cases, e.g.,
mining and logging camps, were employees inaccessible to the reach of
labor organizations. Thus, only in those limited instances would it be
proper to require employers to allow union organizers access to the workplace. This understanding was based on the assumption that except in unusual cases, employees were likely to live very close by to the workplace and
thus be accessible through other efforts. Indeed, the Babcock decision discussed the number of employees in that case living within a walking distance of work. Today's living and work patterns challenge that factual
assumption, giving the Court another reason to adopt a new approach to the
access problem.
VII.
FOLLOWING THE SUPREME COURT'S LEAD IN
PLANNED PARENTHOOD

A.

Background

If our argument so far is correct, and there are good reasons for the
Court to change its approach regarding the access problem, the next step in
our analysis is to provide a comprehensive model to lead us out of the
current situation. In this section we attempt to provide the contours of a
new approach to the problem of union and employee access to the property
of employers for organizing purposes. We start by evaluating recently in253. Diamond Walnut Growers, Inc. v. NLRB, 80 F. 3d 485 (D.C. Cir. 1996), vacated and reh'g en
banc granted, 88 F.3d 1064 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
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troduced legislation dealing with the question of salting. Such legislation,
while probably a good first step, falls short of providing a comprehensive
solution to the access problem. We then identify various other dimensions
of the access problem that need to be addressed either legislatively or judicially for a comprehensive solution to occur in this area of the law.
B.

Proposed Legislation

Last year, opponents of salting introduced companion bills in the
House of Representatives2 54 and the Senate2 55 to outlaw the practice. These
bills were entitled the "Truth in Employment Act of 1997. "256 According
to one of their sponsors, Republican Congressman Harris Fawell of Illinois,
they were designed to "make it clear that an employer is not required to hire
any person who seeks a job in order to promote interests unrelated to those
of the employer. '257 Congressman Fawell contends that under current laws,
employers must choose between "two unpleasant options" - hiring a "salt"
who may "disrupt the workplace and file frivolous charges resulting in
costly litigation," or denying the "salt" employment and being sued for discrimination under the Act.2 8 The proposed legislation would permit employers to deny employment or fire salts while purportedly not infringing
"on the rights or protections otherwise accorded employees under the
NLRA.

25 9

Section 2 of the proposed legislation is based on a number of congressional "findings." First, it begins with the premise that an "atmosphere of
trust and civility in labor-management relationships is essential to a productive workplace and a healthy economy. '26 0 The legislation asserts that the
"tactic of using professional union organizers and agents to infiltrate a
targeted employer's workplace, a practice commonly referred to as salting
...threatens the balance of rights which is fundamental to our system of
collective bargaining. 26 1
The legislation insists that salting has "evolved into an aggressive
form of harassment not contemplated" when the NLRA was enacted,26 2 and
that "union organizers are seeking employment with nonunion employers
not because of a desire to work for such employers" but rather "primarily to
organize the employees of such employers or to inflict economic harm. '"263
254. H.R. 758, 105' Cong. (1997) [hereinafter "House Bill"].
255. S. 328, 105"' Cong. (1997) [hereinafter "Senate Bill"].
256. See id.
257. Press Release, House Comm. on Educationand the Workforce: Falwell Introduces the "Truth
in Employment Act of 1997" (visited Nov. 25, 1998) <http://www.house.gov/eeo/press/salting213.htm>.
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. House Bill, supra note 254, and Senate Bill, supra note 255, at § 2(1).
261. House Bill at § 2(2).
262. Id.
263. Id. at § 2(3).
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Further, the legislation asserts that employers "should have the right to expect job applicants to be primarily interested in utilizing" their skills "to
further the goals of the business of the employer."2 " Toward this end it
proposes a specific amendment to section 8(a) of the Act.265 Pursuant to
this proposed amendment, nothing in section 8(a) of the Act would be "construed as requiring an employer to employ any person who seeks or has
sought employment with the employer in furtherance of other employment
or agency status.

266

On February 24, 1998, however, H.R. 758, introduced in 1997, was
incorporated into a new House Bill, H.R. 3246,267 introduced by Congressman William Goodling and entitled the "Fairness for Small Business and
Employers Act of 1998." This bill added various other pro-small business
NLRA reforms to the truth-in-employment language.2 68 The House Committee on Education and the Workforce's report on the bill was sent to the
full House on March 18, 1998.269 It passed the House on March 26, 1998
by a count of 202 - 200.270 The legislation was then sent to the Senate, as
S. 198 1,271 which updated the Truth in Employment Act with the language
of the bill which had been passed by the House in 1998.
The language of H.R. 3246 and S. 1981 is identical to the original
Truth in Employment Act bills' language with one exception. While the
original bills amend section 8(a) of the Act 272 to state that nothing in section 8(a) shall be construed as requiring an employer to hire a person who
seeks employment to further the objectives of another organization, the new
bill clarifies this provision. Under the new legislation, the issue is whether
the job applicant's "primarypurpose" is one of "furthering another employment or agency status. ' 273 The Committee report for H.R. 3246 spells
this out further by stating that a job applicant must have "at least a 50
percent motivation to work for the employer. '274 If a job applicant meets
this fifty percent test, the new legislation makes clear that such a "bona fide
2 75
employee applicant" will be entitled to the full protections of the Act.
264. Id. at § 2(4).
265. Id. at § 4.
266. Id.
267. H.R. 3246, 105th Cong. (1998) [hereinafter "New House Bill"].
268. Id. Titles 1H,111and IV (dealing with small business bargaining units, expeditious handling of
unfair labor practice complaints, and attorneys fees awards to small businesses that prevail in litigation
against the Board).
269. See H.R. REP. No. 105 - 453 (1998).
270. See 144 CoNo. REc. H1622 (daily ed. March 26, 1998). See also supra note 81.
271. S.1981, 105th Cong. (1998) [hereinafter "New Senate Bill"].
272. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1988).
273. New House Bill, supra note 267; New Senate Bill, supra note 271, at § 4, line 5 (emphasis
added).
274. H.R. REP'. No. 105 - 453, supra note 269, text accompanying notes 6-7 (stating the Committee's view that if at least 50% of a prospective employee's intent is not to work for the employer, the
employer may legally refuse to hire the person).
275. New House Bill supra note 267; New Senate Bill, supra note 271, at § 4, lines 6-10.
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In any event, it is the clear intent of this legislation to congressionally
outlaw salting. In doing so, Congress would legislatively overrule the
Court's recent decision in Town & Country.27 6 President Clinton has forcefully vowed to veto such legislation should it pass the House and Senate
and reach his desk. 27
C.

Limitations of the Proposed Legislation

We agree with legislative pronouncements that salting "threatens the
balance of rights which is fundamental to our system of collective bargaining."2 78 As argued above,2 79 salting intrudes on the property and privacy
rights of employers. Salting arguably represents an incursion on employers' rights to run their businesses. Internal labor market analysis would
suggest that salting allows unions to behave "opportunistically" vis-a-vis
employers.2 8 ° We believe an overturning of Town & Country and a direct
outlawing of salting would be a positive step by Congress.
The problem, though, is that it represents only a positive first step.
Outlawing salting without more creates a strong organizational imbalance
in favor of employers. Pursuant to the proposed legislation and Lechmere,
union organizers would be completely barred from all employer property
including quasi-public employer property such as retail store parking lots.
Unions would be relegated to reaching employees outside of the workplace,
primarily at their homes. 28 ' Such organizing is both extremely difficult for
28 3
unions to conduct 28 2 and intrusive on workers' non-work lives.

Consequently, while the proposed congressional legislation outlawing
salting seems correct in that salting "threatens" the proper "balance of
rights" in our collective bargaining system,2 84 it seems incorrect in that
outlawing salting will "preserve" a proper "balance of rights" among the
relevant parties. 285 Taken alone, the proposed legislation helps create a further considerable imbalance of organizational fights against unions. The
276. See supra notes 92-98 and accompanying text.
277. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
278. House Bill, supra note 254; Senate Bill, supra note 255, at § 2(2).
279. See supra notes 99-112 and accompanying text.
280. The ability of unions and employees to behave opportunistically arises from the internal labor
market features of the employment relationships. Employers have invested in employees' training, potentially teaching employees skills somewhat idiosyncratic to the particular employer. In such a context,
employees can behave opportunistically in situations in which monitoring of work effort by the employer is less than perfect. See Leonard Bierman & Rafael Gely, Striker Replacements: A Law, Economics and Negotiations Approach, 68 S. CAL. L. REv. 363 (1995) (applying internal labor market
theory to the striker replacements debate).
281. See supra notes 99-112 and accompanying text.
282. Among other things, union organizers operating in this context are frequently viewed as being
"unauthoritative." See Mark Barenberg, Democracy and Domination in the Law of Workplace Cooperation: From Bureaucraticto Flexible Production, 94 COLUM1. L. REv. 753, 934-35 (1994).
283. See id.
284. House Bill, supra note 254; Senate Bill, supra note 255, at § 2(2).
285. Senate Bill, supra note 255, at § 3(1).

HeinOnline -- 20 Berkeley J. Emp. & Lab. L. 178 1999

1999]

LABOR LAW ACCESS RULES AND STARE DECISIS

proposed legislation is only tenable as a first step part of a package of comprehensive labor law reform in this area.
D. A Model for Comprehensive Reform
1.

Overview

A comprehensive model for reform must focus on legal rules which
are the least intrusive on employer and employee privacy and property
rights. Moreover, while the Court has stated that there are no "mechanical
answers" in the complex area of union organizational access, 286 former
Harvard University President Derek Bok correctly points out that the legal
rules in this area of employment law have become far too obfuscated and
unclear.28 7 In short, in addition to protecting privacy rights, there is a need
for "bright lines" so that parties explicitly know what they can and cannot
do. Towards this end, explicitly outlawing salting, along the general lines
of the pending congressional legislation,2 88 would be a positive first step.
An explicit outlawing of salting would protect employer privacy and property rights and remove the considerable murkiness created by the Court's
decision in Town & Country regarding how employers are to properly deal
with this "Trojan horse" union organizing technique.
2.

The "Home Visits" Doctrine

Similarly, the reform package should contain language directly overruling the Board's "home visits" doctrine.2 89 This doctrine is in many ways
anachronistic, harkening back to an era when employees all lived in homes
near the workplace, and there was only one wage-earner in the family.2 9 °
Today, employees tend to live in widely dispersed areas 291 and as Professor
Marion Crain has noted, female employees juggling employment, housework and child care may have little desire or opportunity to deal with union
issues once they get home.29 2 Moreover, the home visits doctrine represents a strong general invasion of employee rights of privacy, rights the
Court recently emphasized in its DOD decision.29 3
286.

NLRA v. United Steelworkers (NuTone), 357 U.S. 357, 364 (1958).

287. See Derek C. Bok, The Regulation of Campaign Tactics in RepresentationElections Under the
National Labor Relations Act, 78 HARv. L. REV. 38, 102-03 (1964).

288. See supra notes 254-77 and accompanying text. The 50% or "primary purpose" element of
this proposed legislation, though, also seems quite "murky."
289. See supra notes 39-42 and accompanying text.
290. See Michael H. Gottesman & Michael R. Seidl, A Tale of Two Discourses: William Gould's
Journeyfrom the Academy to the World of Politics, 47 STAN. L. REv. 749, 778 (1995) (discussing union
access rules in the context of these cultural changes).
291. See Lechmere, 502 U.S. at 543 (White, J., dissenting).
292.

See Marion G. Crain, Feminizing Unions: Challenging the Gendered Structure of Wage La-

bor, 89 MIcH. L. REv. 1155, 1217-19 (1991).
293. See supra notes 101-104 and accompanying text.
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Finally, it seems a bit disingenuous to argue doctrinally that home visits by employers are "coercive" and "harassing" while such visits by union
organizers are not. Certainly, a review of some of the recent literature regarding continued organized crime infestation of some unions294 might be
somewhat persuasive to the contrary. Moreover, people today are generally
wary of opening their doors to any strangers.295 In sum, the Board's home
visits doctrine as it currently stands is riddled with problems. Incremental
reform of the doctrine proved a significant stumbling block when Congress
considered the proposed Labor Law Reform Act in 1977-78.296 A far better
approach is the "bright line" repealing of the doctrine and the outlawing of
home visits by both unions and employers. This approach also significantly
bolsters protection of employee privacy rights.
3.

Extending Excelsior

In the Excelsior case, the Board, as noted above,297 held that unions be
afforded a list of names and addresses for all employees in a given election
unit within seven days of the Board's ordering of a representation election
in that unit. The problem, though, is that the Board will not order such an
election until the union has provided the Board with evidence that at least
thirty percent of the employees in the given bargaining unit are interested in
being represented by a union.2 98 Moreover, most unions, for strategic purposes, do not seek to schedule such elections until at least fifty percent of
the employees have expressed interest.2 99 Thus, unions simply have no
rights to employee lists under Excelsior during the critical early stage of an
organizing campaign when they are trying to garner enough support to actually have an election scheduled. Simply put, the rights afforded unions
under Excelsior come too late, as many unions never even make it to the
point where Excelsior rights are triggered.
This dynamic was well illustrated in the Lechmere case. In that case a
representation election had not yet been scheduled triggering union Excelsior rights. Instead, the union was just trying to garner at least a thirty
percent showing of interest by unit employees in order to schedule an election. When the employer kicked the union out of the shopping center parking lot, union organizers stood on a public grassy strip near a highway and
recorded license plate numbers of cars parked in the employee area of the
294. See, e.g., Clyde W. Summers, Union Trusteeships and Union Democracy, 24 U. MICH. J. L.
REF. 689 (1991); Randy M. Mastro et al., PrivatePlaintiffs Use of Equitable Remedies Under the RICO
Statute: A Means to Reform Corrupted Labor Unions, 24 U. MICH. J. L. REF. 571 (1991).
295. See generally Estlund, supra note 1, at 331-32.
296. See supra notes 49-57 and accompanying text.
297. See supra notes 43-46 and accompanying text.
298. See 29 C.F.R. § 101.18(a) (1981).
299. See Paul C. Weiler, Promises to Keep: Securing Workers' Rights to Self-Organization Under
the NLRA, 96 HArv. L. REv. 1769, 1776-77 n.22 (1983).
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parking lot.3"' Then, the union apparently received the names and addresses of the individuals who owned these cars from a "mole" at the Connecticut Department of Motor Vehicles.3" 1
It seems a bit ridiculous to put unions through such "hoops" in order to
get employee names and addresses. An offset to the reform package's removal of union rights to engage in salting or home visits would be the
triggering of union Excelsior rights at a much earlier stage in the process.
One possibility would be to trigger such rights once a union demonstrates a
showing of interest from ten percent of the bargaining unit's employees.30 2
Extending union Excelsior rights would not intrude on employer privacy or property rights, and would represent only a relatively mild incursion on employee privacy rights, since unions would not be able to use the
name and address lists to make home visits. Unions could, however, use
in local media, or
the lists to engage in mailings, place targeted advertising
30 3
homes.
employee
to
calls
phone
perhaps make
Professor Cynthia Estlund 3 ' and others 305 have argued, however, that
unions need "sustained face-to-face contact with employees" in order to
conduct meaningful organizational campaigns, and that union mailings and
phone calls are unlikely to be particularly effective.30 6 While extending
union Excelsior rights is clearly not a major counterbalance to the removal
of union salting and home visits rights, it does seem to represent a worthwhile first step. Although mailings and phone calls may not be the most
effective union organizing tools, they are obviously of some use in union
organizing campaigns. 30 7 Moreover, unions, as illustrated in the Lechmere
case, appear to be eager to get employee name and address lists early in
3
organizing campaigns. 11
4.

Bolstering Off-Duty Employee Rights

The Board has vacillated over the years with respect to the organizational rights of off-duty employees. At times, it has likened their status to
that of "trespassing" nonemployees, 3° although it currently appears to allow union organizational activity by off-duty employees so long as such
300. See supra notes 58-71 and accompanying text.
301. Id.
302. See Bierman, supra note 25, at 29.
303. See id. at 28. Telephone calls to employees homes, while intrusive to privacy, do not seem to
rise to the same level as home visits and would thus probably be acceptable. See id. at 28 n.252.
304. See Estlund, supra note 1, at 331.
305. See Gottesman & Seidl, supra note 290, at 778.
306. Id.
307. See GAGALA, supra note 106, at 167-68.
308. The union in Lechmere used the names and addresses it obtained from its "mole" at the Motor
Vehicles Department to send mailings, make phone calls, and conduct some home visits. Lechmere,
Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527, 530 (1992). Under our proposal, the mailings and phone calls would still
be permissible, while the home visits would not.
309. See GTE Lenkurt, Inc., 204 N.L.R.B. 921 (1973).
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activity is conducted outside "the interior of the plant and other working
",3.0 Thus, Professor Robert A. Gorman appears correct in his
areas .
recent assertion that even after Lechmere, off-duty employees have the right
to place "a handbill under the windshield wiper of an automobile known to
belong to a fellow employee." '' Unlike "salters" and other "on-duty" employees, however, off-duty employees are not permitted to engage in union
organizing activities inside the workplace in non-work areas, such as an
employee lounge, or the company cafeteria.
The interior versus exterior off-duty employee workplace "compromise" fashioned by the Board seems like a rather artificial one, 312 and certainly appears open to question in the context of legislative reform
outlawing union salting and home visits. One possible reform might be to
bolster off-duty employee organizational rights by according them the same
rights as "on-duty" employees. Since these off-duty employees are already
admitted onto company property, such a reform would appear to represent
little additional incursion on employer privacy and property rights. 3 13 It
opportunities due to
would also help counter losses in union organizational
31 4
the outlawing of salting and union home visits.
5.

Overruling Lechmere

A comprehensive overhaul of the law concerning access will also require a reassessment of the Babcock and Lechmere decisions. In particular,
the factors that led the Court in 1956 to create the non-employee/employee
dichotomy for purposes of access clearly have changed in the interim period. To a large extent, that is our criticism of the Court's decision in Lechmere. The Court's decision is a classic example of the escalation of
commitment trap in decision-making, in that it evidences an unwillingness
to reevaluate the initial determination in the current context.
In this sense, a legislative reversal of Lechmere might be a necessary
step in de-escalating the access problem. Such a reversal will imply that
non-employee organizers will have some form of right to access to the
workplace, even if just to quasi-public employer property, such as retail
store parking lots. Whether such a reversal is proper requires us to evaluate
a number of factors. For example, is the industrial relations context different enough from the time when Babcock was decided, as to require us to
reassess the nature of the balance struck by the Court in that decision? In
310. Tri-County Medical Center, Inc., 222 N.L.R.B. 1089 (1976).
311. See Robert A. Gorman, Union Access to Private Property:A CriticalAssessment of Lechmere,
Inc. v. NLRB, 9 HOFsTRA LAB. L. J. 1, 21 (1991).
312. See Sarah Kom, Property Rights and Job Security: Workplace Solicitation by Nonemployee
Union Organizers, 94 YALE L. J. 374, 380 n.40 (1984).
313. See Bierman, supra note 25, at 33.
314. It is probably true, however, that such off-duty employees are not as effective at organizing as
trained professionals. See Gresham, supra note 26, at 153-54. However, they do not pose the "Trojan
horse" loyalty problems of "salters."
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answering this question, decision-makers would have to consider factors
such as changes in the demographic characteristics of the labor force,
changes in the living and commuting patterns of employees, and changes in
location of industries. While it is possible to argue, as the Court did in
Babcock, that in the 1950s only those employees in logging or mining
camps were really inaccessible to the union's message, it might very well
be that in the late 1990s inaccessibility is defined in terms of other characteristics. Answering these questions is likely to generate some heated debate. Such a debate, however, is what we argue is needed to de-escalate an
institutional commitment to a decision that is over forty years old.
6.

Captive Audience Replies: Overturning General Electric or Election
Debates?

Within the context of comprehensive labor reform, it is essential that
all aspects of the problem be subject to reassessment. Having proposed
abolishing the right of unions to engage in home visits, and having prevented the ability of unions to use "salters," it is important to consider alternatives that offset these losses for unions and that in turn create a better
balance in union/management organizational access. Direct union access to
employer workplaces, at least for the purpose of participating in some direct
election dialogue, will help achieve this balance.3" 5
One idea worth exploring in this context "is the possible institution of
Board sponsored union/management election debates."3 t6 While the general notion of promoting "free debate on issues dividing labor and management 3 7 has of course long been a central one under the Act, this concept
has never been operationalized by the actual scheduling of Board sponsored
give-and-take election debates.
There are various ways in which the debates could be structured and
relatively easily incorporated into the current regulatory framework. For
instance, Congress may mandate a set number of such debates to be held
on working premises during working time as part of any given representation election campaign. Such debates would replace the right of employers
to deliver "captive audience" speeches, as well as the argued-for right of
unions to reply to such speeches.3 t8 The discourse generated in such debates would better serve to inform and educate the individual employees
about the issues involved in the organizing campaign than the combination
of an employer captive audience speech and a possible reply by the union.
315. See Martin H. Malin, Labor Law Reform: Waiting For Congress, 69 Cm.-KENT L. REv. 277,
279-81 (1994) (discussing the need for changes in the law concerning representation elections under the
Act).
316. Bierman, supra note 25, at 34.
317. Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers of America, 383 U.S. 53, 62 (1966).
318. See id.
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Summary

We have outlined in this section what we argue is a strategy to change
the direction of the law regulating the access of unions and employees to
the employer's private property for purposes of organizing. Our contention
is that such a strategy requires a comprehensive assessment of the access
problem in the context of the industrial relations system of today.
VIII.
CONCLUSION

One of the most complex and difficult areas of labor law is the regulation of union and employee access to employer property for purposes of
organizing. Starting from the initial "clear-cut" distinctions between working time and non-working time and employees and non-employees, the
rules governing the access issue have become increasingly and unduly complicated. In particular, the recent Court decisions in Lechmere and Town &
Country have exacerbated an already difficult situation. We have suggested
a theoretical framework which we believe may be helpful in understanding
these developments.
We first reviewed the case law regarding the access problem and identified two major problems with the current legal approach to this problem.
First, the Court has dealt piecemeal with the various aspects of this problem
without attempting to develop a coherent framework. Second, the Court
has been reluctant to analyze the access issue within the context of today's
workplace. We then argued that these two problems are related to doctrine
of stare decisis. Relying on theoretical developments in decision-making
sciences, we argued that the Court's use of precedent can be understood as
an escalation of commitment problem. Having developed this theoretical
framework, we proposed a comprehensive set of reforms which include: the
outlawing of salting and of union's home visits; the expansion of the Excelsior list doctrine, and of the rights of off-duty employees; and the overruling
of the Lechmere decision. This proposed legislative reform is presented in
the context of legislation which was recently enacted by the House of Representatives and is currently before the Senate. We believe that our proposals are comprehensive, and that they address the problems we identified in
our review of the case law in this area. We hope these proposals provide the
framework for a positive and robust debate.
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